BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER
UNITED STATES AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 90-201

UNITED STATES AIR FORCES IN EUROPE
Supplement 1

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Command Policy

INSPECTOR GENERAL ACTIVITIES

COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY

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(SMSgt Michael P. Ronayne)
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AFI 90-201, 30 September 2003, is supplemented as follows: This supplement prescribes guidance and procedures for the conduct of inspection activities within USAFE. This supplement also prescribes the USAFE inspection guide. Only this supplement may establish formal command-wide inspection requirements. This supplement applies to all USAFE units and contains Joint Safety and Security Inspection (JSSI) criteria that apply to all North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) host units to munitions support squadrons (MUNSS). This supplement applies to Air National Guard (ANG) units and members assigned or attached to USAFE; it does not apply to Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) units. Personnel responsible for maintaining paper copies of AFI 90-201, *Inspector General Activities* will reference this supplement on the title page of the basic publication. Send comments and suggestions for improvements, through channels, using AF Form 847, **Recommendation for Change of Publication**, to Inspector General (HQ USAFE/IG), Unit 3050, Box 60, APO AE 09094-5060. Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained in accordance with AFMAN 37-123, *Management of Records* and disposed of in accordance with the Air Force Records Disposition Schedule (RDS) located at: **https://webrims.amc.af.mil**.

SUMMARY OF REVISIONS

This document is substantially revised and must be reviewed in its entirety. This revision reorganized paragraphs to mirror AFI 90-201 format. Clarified the role of USAFE Functional Staffs in developing policies required to implement this instruction. Addendums A, B, C are rescinded. **Attachment 9 (Added)** establishes Full Spectrum Threat Response (FSTR) evaluation procedures for IG and Unit Exercise Evaluation Teams in accordance with AFI 10-2501 *Full Spectrum Threat Response (FSTR) Planning and Operations*. **Attachment 10 (Added)** provides instructions for Functional Implementation Guides,

Attachment 11 (Added) provides guidance on simulation and deviation policy, and **Attachment 12 (Added)** defines Multimedia Support.

1.6. The USAFE Inspector General (HQ USAFE/IG) provides leaders with credible, independent and objective assessment processes to measure the capability of assigned forces and effective use of resources. The IG recognizes best practices, lessons learned, and innovative methods to accomplish the Air Force mission.

1.6.1. HQ USAFE directorates are responsible for the development of Nuclear Surety Inspection and Joint Safety and Security Inspection (NSI/JSSI) Functional Inspection Guides (FIG) pertaining to their functional area of responsibility. These guides will establish specific inspection criteria. Nuclear and Conventional Weapons Division (HQ USAFE/A4W) compiles and forwards command NSI/JSSI checklists to the Air Force Safety Center, Safety Weapons Division (HQ AFSC/SEW). USAFEI 91-101, *Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit (SAV) And Functional Expert Visit (FEV) Program Management*, contains command guidance on NSI/JSSI FIG requirements. USAFE Inspector General Inspections Division (HQ USAFE/IGI) acts as the Corrective Action Report Status (CARS) program monitor to track corrective actions for all Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) inspection reports.

2.1.3. HQ USAFE directorates will develop and maintain separate FIGs for Unit Compliance Inspections (UCI) and Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI). These guides will establish specific inspection criteria. USAFE Staff OPRs will ensure ORI guides include Common Core Readiness Criteria and UCI guides include Common Core Compliance Area Application. FIGs will be developed in accordance with **Attachment 10 (Added)**.

2.1.7. (Added) Staff Assistance Visits (SAV). If a unit is to undergo a SAV (i.e. Logistics Standardization and Evaluation Team, Conventional SAV, Nuclear Surety SAV, etc.) by USAFE or other higher headquarters staff agencies, the visit should be completed at least 60 days prior to the start of a scheduled HQ USAFE/IG inspection. Inform USAFE Chief of Inspections (HQ USAFE/IGI) when SAVs are scheduled within 60 days of an inspection to prevent possible conflicts of staff activities. SAVs are reported under the Gatekeeper Program. Visits by staff personnel, not part of a SAV do not fall under the provisions of this supplement.

2.2.1. HQ USAFE/IG conducts ORIs of selected USAFE units. The inspection will evaluate the unit's response to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or United Stated higher headquarters (US HHQ) tasking. The ORI is conducted in two phases. Phase I is the evaluation of the unit's transition from peacetime readiness into a wartime posture. Phase II is the evaluation of the unit's ability to meet wartime tasking, to include mission support. Evaluate mission support during either Phase I and (or) Phase II. Depending upon the ORI scenario, units will receive an intelligence build-up and higher headquarters message reflecting the phases of time sensitive planning.

2.2.1.1. Phase I ORIs will reflect the unit's ability to respond to short-notice mission taskings and will be driven by a scenario provided by HQ USAFE/IG. The inspection will focus on three primary functions of a unit's initial response to operational mission taskings. These functions include the unit's ability to generate, deploy and regenerate units for mission employment, their ability to process and deploy Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS) Unit Type Codes (UTC) for expeditionary support operations and their ability to protect the unit's main operating base personnel and resources from locally-based intruder and terrorist threats during these operations (i.e., Force Protection).

2.2.1.4. (Added) Units receiving NATO tactical evaluations (Operational and Strike) will normally receive ORI credit for areas evaluated by NATO. HQ USAFE/IG will appoint a US National Representa-

tive (NATREP) for all NATO evaluations. Areas not evaluated by NATO will be inspected by HQ USAFE/IG within 90 days of the NATO evaluation, using guidance in Attachment 5. of the basic publication.

2.2.1.4.1. (Added) HQ USAFE Directorates and wings/installations will support NATO tactical evaluations by providing evaluators for Operational and Strike evaluations, to the maximum extent possible, when requested by HQ USAFE/IG. The IG will fund required evaluator training.

2.2.1.5. (Added) Phase I Readiness Assessment Visits (RAV)/ORIs in conjunction with Exercise/Contingency Tasking. Phase I inspections will not normally be conducted in conjunction with real-world events. However, Commander United States Air Forces in Europe (COMUSAFE) may task the IG to assess contingency deployments at specific units. Under these circumstances, the IG team will observe unit actions without input or interference. The team will then produce a report summarizing the unit's ability to meet contingency taskings. If unique circumstances warrant consideration to conduct an ORI during contingency taskings, two criteria must be met. The deployment must be of a magnitude to adequately demonstrate the unit's combat capability, as well as, coordinated with the IG and approved by COMUSAFE.

2.2.1.6. (Added) Tasking. The unit will receive specific deployment tasking in a simulated Deployment Order (DEPORD) at inspection initiation. Detailed information such as specific taskings, simulated airflow, personnel requirements, small arms and deployment bag requirements will be issued with the DEPORD. If required, the first strategic airlift arrival will be no earlier than (NET) 12 hours after inspection initiation. Air Tasking Orders (ATO) specifying deployment tasking and first employment mission details will also be issued at inspection initiation.

2.2.1.6.1. (Added) Host Unit/Base X Support Plan (BSP). Units will normally be tasked to deploy to a simulated forward location (Base X). Other ECS UTCs may or may not be tasked to deploy to the same Base X. The IG will distribute a Base X Support Plan or utilize an existing BSP within the command.

2.2.1.6.2. (Added) Simulated Host Support. Personnel, vehicles and equipment used as simulated host unit support must be visually identified (e.g., armband, badge, vehicle/equipment markings, etc.) during the entire ORI. Units will provide the IG with a document to identify the host unit support population and a list of all non-UTC vehicles and equipment to be used as war reserve materiel (WRM)/host unit support equipment.

2.2.1.7. (Added) IG-Directed Exercises. The IG may direct the unit Exercise Evaluation Team (EET) to plan, execute and evaluate specific exercises as part of the phase I ORI in accordance with FSTR **Attachment 9 (Added)**.

2.2.1.8. (Added) ORI Initiation. HQ USAFE/IG inspections are initiated by an emergency action message (EAM) or by an execution-tasking message transmitted by electronic means or hand-delivered. IG inspectors will provide the simulated DEPORD, ATOs and special instructions (SPINs) as required. The IG Team will conduct a formal in-brief for the wing commander and staff shortly after arrival. The unit will assist the IG Team in establishment of the IG Team Center.

2.2.1.8.1. (Added) The unit wing operations center (WOC) time will be used as the standard for all timed events.

2.2.1.8.2. (Added) Upon ORI initiation, all assigned personnel present for duty are considered available for tasking. The unit commander may withdraw unit members from annual/refresher training, but not from formal schools. Simulate recall of personnel on leave or Temporary Duty (TDY), if required, to fill UTC tasking. Simulated recall must be completed in time for them to deploy.

2.2.1.8.3. (Added) The IG Team will function as higher headquarter (HHQ) (known as "EAGLE OPS") for all ORI-associated events. “EAGLE OPS” communication rules, procedures and support requirements will be provided at the pre-visit coordination meeting.

2.2.1.9. (Added) Safety.

2.2.1.9.1. (Added) Responsibilities. If deviation from the ORI scenario in the interest of safety becomes necessary, inform the IG Team Chief or an appropriate inspector of the reasons for the deviation. The IG and or unit will stop all unsafe operations. The IG Team Chief or unit commander may declare recesses for unforeseen circumstances such as weather or other uncontrollable factor(s) adversely affecting safe operations. The unit commander is the final authority for launching missions and is responsible for the safety of unit aircraft, aircrews, support personnel and equipment.

2.2.1.9.2. (Added) Safety Violations. IG evaluators will assess safety throughout the inspection. Violations of safety standards impact ratings in those areas in which the violation is observed. Impact on ratings depends on the severity of the violation and the impact/potential impact on unit readiness.

2.2.1.10. (Added) HQ USAFE/IG publishes a permanent team member Entry Authorization List (EAL) in accordance with USAFE Supplement 1 to AFI 31-101, *Air Force Installation Security Program*.

2.2.1.11. (Added) Simulations/Deviations. All approved standing simulations/deviations are located in **Attachment 11 (Added)**. Any additional simulations/deviations must follow the format and rules in **Attachment 11 (Added)**. They must be consolidated and submitted to the IG prior to the pre-visit coordination meeting. All simulations and deviations will be finalized by the IG not later than 2 weeks prior to the vulnerability period. The IG may validate the request for simulation/deviation with the appropriate USAFE staff directorate.

2.2.1.12. (Added) Deliverables. The following deliverables are due to HQ USAFE/IG at the time indicated.

2.2.1.12.1. (Added) 90 days prior to Vulnerability Window.

2.2.1.12.1.1. (Added) Pre-visit Coordination Meeting:

2.2.1.12.1.1.1. (Added) Initial Simulation/Deviation Requests.

2.2.1.12.1.1.2. (Added) Base X Base Support Plan (BSP) inputs.

2.2.1.12.2. (Added) 60 days prior to Vulnerability Window:

2.2.1.12.2.1. (Added) Unit Installation Deployment Plan (IDP).

2.2.1.12.2.2. (Added) Unit Installation Security Plan (ISP) and Force Protection plan (if not in ISP).

2.2.1.12.2.3. (Added) Personnel Deployment Facility Operating Instruction (if it exists).

2.2.1.12.2.4. (Added) Installation FSTR Plan 10-2.

2.2.1.12.2.5. (Added) Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Plan (if not in FSTR Plan 10-2).

2.2.1.12.2.6. (Added) OG/MXG/MSG/MDG Operating Instruction Index.

2.2.1.12.2.7. (Added) Disaster Preparedness Grid Map.

2.2.1.12.2.8. (Added) . Airfield Diagram

2.2.1.12.2.9. (Added) Explosive Area Map.

2.2.1.12.2.10. (Added) Critical Facility Listing (if not in the ISP). As a minimum, the list should contain facility priority number, building or facility number, grid coordinates, facility nomenclature or exercise function, and alternate facility location for that function in the event the primary becomes unusable.

2.2.1.12.2.11. (Added) Listing of approved local area hotels with contact information.

2.2.1.12.3. (Added) 14 days prior to Vulnerability Window:

2.2.1.12.3.1. (Added) Final Simulation/Deviation (Sim/Dev) requests.

2.2.1.12.3.2. (Added) Local area safety briefing.

2.2.1.12.3.3. (Added) Flightline safety briefing and license issue.

2.2.1.12.3.4. (Added) On-base driving vehicle pass coordination information.

2.2.1.12.3.5. (Added) EET-generated scenarios for IG directed exercises (4 exercise scenarios in accordance with **Attachment 9 (Added)**).

2.2.1.12.4. (Added) ORI Initiation:

2.2.1.12.4.1. (Added) List of aircraft tail numbers for generation and deployment, (including spares) at Reference Start Time (RST) 1+30.

2.2.1.12.4.2. (Added) All unit Designated Operational Capability (DOC) statements.

2.2.1.12.4.3. (Added) Status of Resource and Training Systems (SORTS) reports at RST 1+30 including the following: Letters of appointment for each unit SORTS monitor, latest work sheets, latest unit database printout, presentation material provided to the unit's staff (i.e. slides, handouts, worksheets, etc), current letter of "X's" for each flying squadron.

2.2.1.12.4.4. (Added) Deployment support documentation including applicable Deliberate and Crisis Action Planning and Execution System (DCAPES), Logistics Module (LOGMOD) or Logistics Module Stand-Alone (LMSA), and Manpower Personnel-Base Level (MANPER-B) generated products immediately following the Deployment Concept Briefing.

2.2.1.12.4.5. (Added) Aircrew mission materials will be delivered to the aircrew operations inspector prior to the deployment briefing and the employment mission briefing respectively.

2.2.1.12.4.6. (Added) The unit may request that the IG consider any additional issues (e.g., out of cycle UTC tasking.) that may have occurred since the Sims/Devs were finalized.

2.2.1.12.4.7. (Added) Deliver all ORI exercise record messages, whether actual or simulated, to the deployed message center for processing as required. Additionally, transmit/deliver all inspection-generated messages and reports directly to "EAGLE OPS". Exercise traffic, not for transmission, will contain the following statement in the special instructions block: "FOR EXERCISE USE ONLY, DO NOT TRANSMIT". If using floppy disks, then the disk or releasing document will be labeled "FOR EXERCISE USE ONLY, DO NOT TRANSMIT". All messages must be in the Joint Users Handbook-Message Text Format (JUH-MTF) according to AFMAN 33-326, *Preparing Official Communications*.

2.2.1.12.4.7.1. (Added) Actual events/incidents occurring during the inspection period will be routed according to applicable directives. All exercise events/incidents will be passed and elevated to the next applicable HHQ except when otherwise specified by the Command Post (CP)/Battle Staff inspector.

2.2.1.12.4.7.2. (Added) Exercise Battle Staff activation, deactivation, attainment reports, operational reports (OPREP-3) and Situation Reports (SITREP) will be transmitted to "EAGLE OPS" via communi-

cations center or as directed by the IG. "ZEN" will be placed in front of all actual addresses required to be in each report to block actual transmission to HHQs. The IG will ensure correct addresses have "ZEN" in place prior to transmission.

2.2.1.12.4.7.3. (Added) A copy of all outgoing messages will be given to the CP/Battle Staff inspector.

2.2.1.12.5. (Added) ORI Termination:

2.2.1.12.5.1. (Added) The IG Team Chief will declare "Exercise Termination" to denote the completion of mobility processing activities and security exercises only. The IG Team Chief will provide the wing commander with an "ENDEX" declaration in writing to announce the end of all inspection activities. After the IG Team Chief declares ENDEX, the unit should anticipate an additional 2 days of IG validation prior to outbrief.

2.2.1.12.5.2. (Added) Deployment Control Center (DCC). As soon as possible after exercise termination, the DCC or applicable squadron will consolidate and provide the following documentation to the IG:

2.2.1.12.5.2.1. (Added) All exercise messages received and dispatched.

2.2.1.12.5.2.2. (Added) Shippers Declaration of Dangerous Goods, sample book, and any DD Forms 1387-2, **Special Handling Data/Certification**, used by the Cargo Deployment Function (CDF) in-check point. Include letters authorizing personnel to sign DD Forms 1387-2.

2.2.1.12.5.2.3. (Added) One copy of each Contingency Exercise Deployment (CED) orders and amendments prepared by the deployment-processing unit. Provide the deployment inspector a copy of each classified order published.

2.2.1.12.5.2.4. (Added) The aircraft and troop commander packages, station file copy of the manifests and load lists, and the documentation provided to cargo couriers by load number.

2.2.1.12.5.2.5. (Added) All work center discrepancy or workload lists, and Data Pattern Traffic (DPT) log. Discrepancy lists must provide the complete personnel deployment function (PDF), name, and deploying squadron of the individual cited for a deficiency.

2.2.1.12.5.2.6. (Added) A complete deployment schedule of events, including changes.

2.2.1.12.5.2.7. (Added) All logs maintained by the deployment work center supervisors and controllers (i.e., installation deployment officer, personnel representative, Transportation Control Officer (TCO), ramp coordinator, etc.).

2.2.1.12.5.2.8. (Added) Deployment Requirements Manning Document (DRMD) with all deploying personnel data. Include Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) and skill-level substitutions and non-availability waivers.

2.2.1.12.5.3. (Added) Commander Logistics Readiness Squadron (LRS/CC):

2.2.1.12.5.3.1. (Added) Copies of all Mobility Readiness Spares Packages (MRSP)/Mission Support Kit (MSK) listings (R43/R50) deployed for the exercise in location sequence.

2.2.1.12.5.3.2. (Added) Copies of all completed Aircraft Sustainability Model (ASM) assessments.

2.2.1.12.5.3.3. (Added) Log sheet for parts delivery times in support of the generation. POL refuel/de-fuel log sheet for the generation and regeneration.

2.2.1.12.5.3.4. (Added) Number of aircraft refueled.

2.2.1.12.5.3.5. (Added) Quantity of fuel dispensed.

2.2.1.12.5.3.6. (Added) Number of aircraft de-fueled.

2.2.1.12.5.3.7. (Added) Quantity of fuel de-fueled.

2.2.2. The Phase I ORI will be no-notice.

2.2.2.1. (Added) Scheduling. The Phase I ORI will normally be scheduled within a 3 month time period known as the vulnerability window. HQ USAFE/IG will coordinate the vulnerability window with Directorate of Operations functionals (HQ USAFE/A3T, A3X, and AMOCC).

2.2.2.2. (Added) Units will receive a notification message approximately 120 days prior to the start of the unit's vulnerability window. At approximately 90 days prior to the beginning of the unit's vulnerability window, the unit will host a pre-visit meeting to coordinate details of the upcoming inspection. IG generated intelligence build-up will continue in the 3 months prior to the vulnerability window. Warning and Alert Orders will be provided by HQ USAFE/IG as required.

2.3.1. HQ USAFE/IG conducts UCIs on all active units for compliance with US federal and host-nation laws, executive orders, Department of Defense and Air Force directives. Geographically Separated Units (GSU) may be inspected individually or as groups. Units already subject to other compliance inspections (e.g. Health Services Inspection, Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations, Air Traffic System Evaluation Program, and Environmental Safety and Occupational Health Compliance Assessment and Management Program) may be exempt from UCIs unless directed by COMUSAFE.

2.3.3. The five-tier grading system will be used for all activities except contract functions. The five-tier grading scale is Outstanding, Excellent, Satisfactory, Marginal and Unsatisfactory. The Flight is normally the lowest organization level that will receive a rating. Flight ratings will be rolled up into an overall squadron rating. Squadron ratings will be rolled up into group level. Wing Staff, group, Special Interest Item (SII) and Full Spectrum Threat Response exercise ratings will be rolled up to determine an overall wing grade. All ratings are result oriented and based on mission impact. When rating a functional or subfunctional area, the word “mission” refers to the mission of that particular rated area.

2.3.5.1. HQ USAFE/IG will conduct Contracted Support Activity Inspections (CSAI) of the parent unit having oversight responsibilities of the contractor. HQ USAFE/IG publishes a separate report for all contractor-related activities. A three-tier rating system, Complies, Complies with Comments, Does Not Comply, is used. Only specific functions will be assessed as specified in the contractual agreement. The parent unit having oversight responsibilities of the contractor reports corrective action responses for contractor activities.

2.3.6. (Added) Multimedia Support. Units will provide support as outlined in **Attachment 12 (Added)**.

2.5.4. (Added) The IG and Wing Exercise Evaluation Teams (EET) will plan and execute all Full Spectrum Threat Response evaluations in accordance with **Attachment 9 (Added)**.

2.5.5. (Added) EURO FLASH. The IG will plan and execute command-wide no-notice force protection exercises known as EURO FLASH (EF). The IG will evaluate all force protection functions and the unit’s ability to respond. Execution could, but not necessarily, coincide with FSTR scenarios in accordance with **Attachment 9 (Added)**.

2.5.5.1. (Added) There are no standing simulations or deviations. However, the IG Team Chief at individual locations may authorize simulations or deviations once capability and sustainability are demonstrated. Simulations may be granted for any action necessary to accomplish actual operational missions. ***EXAM-***

PLE**:* Ensure crew rest for alert force. Simulations will be considered for implementation of Force Protection Condition (FPCON) Charlie entry procedures at installation gates for extended periods of time. Deviations will be considered for safety, cost, Ministry of Defense (MOD) requirements, etc. ***EXAMPLE: Purchase of additional barriers.

2.6.1.4. (Added) Repeat Deficiency. Any deficiency identified in the unit's prior inspection report.

2.6.5. (Added) When the same deficiency occurs at multiple installations within the command or when an outside staff agency has responsibility for a deficiency, the IG Team Chief identifies the deficiency in the report and identifies the appropriate command directorate needed for assistance in resolution. These items are cross-referenced in an appropriate chapter to the unit report titled "Problems Requiring Outside Solution."

2.6.6. (Added) Fraud, Waste, and Abuse (FWA) Item. If actual fraud is determined by appropriate authority, or if sufficient validated evidence indicates potential fraud, the finding is not included in the report. Instead, a memorandum of the inspection finding is prepared and forwarded to the team chief. The team chief furnishes the memorandum to the Office of Special Investigations (OSI) and the commander concerned. Inspection findings supported by sufficient validated evidence of (potential) waste or abuse are identified with the acronym "FWA" in parentheses and a final bullet stating: "This is a potential item under the Air Force Fraud, Waste, and Abuse Program."

2.7.1. The SII must contribute to USAFE mission readiness.

2.7.1.1. (Added) Consider other means to emphasize a review of the process other than through an SII, i.e. messages to units, staff assistance visits, or a review of computer programs that could provide the same information. Do not use an SII to address ancillary administrative matters.

2.7.2.1. HQ USAFE/IGI serves as the focal point for all USAFE SII proposals.

2.7.2.2. USAFE SII Approval Procedures. When a proposed SII is received, HQ USAFE/IGI will evaluate the SII to determine if it should be sent to the Secretary of the Air Force Inspector General Inspection Directorate (SAF/IGI) for Air Force-level implementation. Once reviewed, HQ USAFE/IGI will coordinate the SII package with all applicable HQ USAFE directorates. Following coordination, HQ USAFE/IGI will forward the SII package through Vice Commander (HQ USAFE/CV) for COMUSAFE approval. If approved, HQ USAFE/IG will send a notification message to applicable units and will post the SII on the HQ USAFE/IG Web Page.

2.7.3.3. The period covered by USAFE SIIs will not exceed 12 months unless approved by the IG. Justification for SIIs longer than 12 months must accompany the SII proposal. The OPR will send extension requests for existing SIIs to the IG a minimum of 30 days prior to the quarter in which the SII expires.

2.8.1. USAFE/IG Training. Standardized training on IG team procedures is required. HQ USAFE/IGI will arrange for Associate Inspectors (AI) to attend the USAFE/IG Inspector Course (as required).

2.9.3. USAFE/IG reports will be available on the USAFE Inspector General web site. Instructions for obtaining access to reports will be located on this web site.

2.9.4. (Added) Corrective Action Response:

2.9.4.1. (Added) If the formal inspection report identifies a finding, the inspected unit will process a written reply for corrective action as follows:

2.9.4.1.1. (Added) Submit a written reply (as directed in the inspection report) to HQ USAFE IGI , within 5 workdays after the formal inspection report is received. As a minimum, the initial response will be a receipt acknowledgement of the inspection report to begin tracking findings and suspense timelines.

2.9.4.1.2. (Added) Process corrective action replies through command channels to HQ USAFE/IGI, with courtesy copies to appropriate staff directorates. HQ USAFE/IGI may request staff directorate guidance on findings that are unresolved or need further clarification.

2.9.4.1.3. (Added) Identify all corrective action replies as initial, follow-up, or final. HQ USAFE/IGI will make final determination on closure of all findings.

2.9.4.1.4. (Added) Submit follow-up reports every 30 calendar days until all findings are closed.

2.9.4.2. (Added) The IG point-of-contact for inspection reports is the HQ USAFE/IGI. Reports are monitored for corrective action on all findings.

2.9.4.3. (Added) HQ USAFE/IGI will assign a suspense tracking number to each finding.

2.9.4.4. (Added) For findings taking more than 1 year to close USAFE Staff Directorate office of primary responsibility (OPR) will present status and progress of unit corrective action(s) to the HQ USAFE/IG.

2.10.1. Trusted Agents. HQ USAFE/IG will designate individuals as trusted agents to handle and safeguard programming and planning information until released by the HQ USAFE/IG. Trusted agents will not divulge any information to unauthorized individuals. If a commander discovers an unauthorized disclosure, they will take immediate action to correct the problem and inform the respective IG that trusted agent information has been compromised. Mark all schedules and other inspection sensitive information with “TRUSTED AGENT INFORMATION”. Individuals designated as trusted agents will be responsible to the IG Team Chief.

2.11.3. USAFE Gatekeeper. The USAFE Gatekeeper is HQ USAFE/IGI, Unit 3050 Box 60, APO AE 09094-5060, Attention Gatekeeper, E-mail address: **mailto:usafeig.dmsv3@ramstein.af.mil**. HQ USAFE/IGI is responsible for submitting projected quarterly inspection activity to Air Force Inspection Agency (AFIA) for coordination.

2.11.3.1. HQ USAFE/IGI will relay visit notifications to appropriate wing Gatekeepers and national Ministry of Defense as appropriate.

2.11.4. (Added) Wing Gatekeeper Responsibilities. The Wing Gatekeeper will serve as the wing focal point of contact for notification of wing and subordinate level evaluations and deconflict schedules to minimize impact on wing and subordinate level units. All units and staff agencies (as required) provide inputs of unit commitments and tasking to the IG. Wing Gatekeepers do not have authority to deny access to inspectors and auditors from agencies outside of the wing. If attempts at deconflicting fail, then HQ USAFE/IGI will assist with external deconfliction.

2.13. (Added) Inspection Planning Requirements. HQ USAFE/IG will identify the USAFE/IG Project Officer in the unit’s inspection announcement message. Command units will provide the following information to the IG Project Officer upon notification of an inspection:

2.13.1. (Added) Unit Project Officer, include name, rank, unit, and office symbol, e-mail address, DSN voice, and fax telephone numbers.

2.13.2. (Added) Organizational structure charts showing the peacetime and wartime relationships between organizations and within the chain of command.

2.13.3. (Added) Base telephone book, maps of base and local area, ground safety and driving fact sheet.

2.13.4. (Added) Force structure to include number and type aircraft assigned (as applicable).

2.13.5. (Added) Number of personnel assigned--officer, enlisted, and civilian (breakdown by group and by squadron).

2.13.6. (Added) Key personnel listing including group and squadron. Show full name, rank, position, date assigned to position, and DSN telephone number. Include biographies for group commanders and above and the Command Chief Master Sergeant.

2.13.7. (Added) For tenant units, include unit designator and address for host organization units providing host base support. If more than one unit provides host base support, give a detailed breakout of the type of support each unit provides.

2.13.8. (Added) Unit designator and plain language address of the servicing communications center, and the name and telephone number of a point of contact at the unit. The inspected unit coordinates with the communications center to ensure the IG has message release and pick-up authority.

2.13.9. (Added) Telephone numbers used for the IG Team Chief, team center, and IG information management during the team's visit.

2.13.10. (Added) Information regarding any on-going test programs or special projects.

2.13.11. (Added) Copy of Unit Committed Munitions List (if applicable).

2.13.12. (Added) Copy of title or number index to all unit operating instructions and plans. Upon review, the HQ USAFE/IG may request a copy of particular publications to familiarize inspectors with unit procedures prior to start of inspection.

2.14. (Added) Limiting Factors (LIMFAC). The unit will identify any known LIMFACs to the IG. When unit LIMFACs impact an area's mission, the IG will evaluate the area accordingly, unless, in the opinion of the IG Team Chief, extenuating circumstances exist. The IG Team Chief will explain the impact of LIMFACs on a unit's capability in the final report.

2.15. (Added) Transportation. The unit POC should confirm exact vehicle requirements with the IG Project Officer as early as possible in the planning process. Maximum use of government vehicles is required. Identify and mark adequate reserved parking spaces adjacent to the IG work center, unit headquarters, group, squadron, maintenance buildings, and other IG support facilities as required. Units will ensure the following are available for each IG team vehicle:

2.15.1. (Added) IG Team placard in window.

2.15.2. (Added) Local area, base, and flightline maps with key facilities and driving restrictions and/or procedures annotated.

2.15.3. (Added) Authorization to drive on flightline, if applicable.

2.15.4. (Added) Accident information (duty and after duty hours phone numbers).

2.15.5. (Added) Phone number to call if vehicle problems develop.

2.15.6. (Added) Gas pump hours, location, and access to gas pump key (authorized GOV).

2.15.7. (Added) Ice scrapers during cold weather (if unit provided).

2.15.8. (Added) Units coordinate or arrange fuels support for IG vehicles during the inspection with the IG Project Officer.

2.16. (Added) IG Team Center. Inspected units will provide facilities for an operational team center. The unit will coordinate requirements with the IG project officer.

2.16.1. (Added) Provide multi-channel ultra-high frequency (UHF) and very-high frequency (VHF) radios for each land mobile radio (LMR) net used by inspected base agencies. Include a copy of all call signs associated with the LMR network. The size and composition of the inspection team determines the total number of LMRs. The IG project officer will identify requirements to the inspected unit during the coordination process.

2.17. (Added) Message Traffic:

2.17.1. (Added) The USAFE Command Center will provide HQ USAFE/IG "AZIMUTH STAR" Emergency Action Message (EAM) support as directed in United States European Command (USEUCOM), Emergency Action Procedures, Volume I, dated 01 May 2002 (Classified).

2.17.2. (Added) Inspector General, Operations (HQ USAFE/IGO) will submit EAM requests to the Air Forces Europe Command and Control Division (AFEUR/A31) in writing approximately 30 days prior to the start of an evaluation.

2.17.3. (Added) Short-notice EAM support. Inspectors may communicate directly with the USAFE Command Center for short-notice changes to the inspection message schedule.

2.17.4. (Added) The unit will prepare all other messages and communications required by the inspection.

2.18. (Added) Message Preparation and Handling:

2.18.1. (Added) Inspected units will deliver all exercise record messages to the area IG inspector. "EXERCISE" and the name of the exercise must clearly appear above the message ID (MSGID) line. The exercise name must precede and follow the message text. All messages must be in US message text format (USMTF).

2.18.2. (Added) Inspected units will not transmit inspection-related exercise message traffic off base unless prior coordination is made with the IG Team Chief. The simulated time of transmission will be the time the message traffic is provided to the appropriate inspector.

2.19. (Added) Notification Responsibilities:

2.19.1. (Added) HQ USAFE/IGI will publish a consolidated inspection schedule (except no notice) a minimum of 6 months out, forecasting at least 12 months of inspection activity. The schedule will be posted on the USAFE/IG web page.

2.19.2. (Added) HQ USAFE/IG will prepare and send an "Inspection Announcement" message or letter for all HQ USAFE/IG inspections. Units are vulnerable to limited or no-notice inspections. For Limited Notice inspections, notification will be by message 72 hours prior to the start of the inspection.

2.19.3. (Added) When the inspected unit is a tenant, the message will also be addressed to the host unit to delineate the evaluated host base support areas.

2.20. (Added) Inspection Failures:

2.20.1. (Added) A re-inspection of a unit will be at COMUSAFE discretion. For NSI/JSSI failure see AFI 90-201, Chapter 3.

2.20.2. (Added) HQ USAFE/IG may re-inspect areas with overall MARGINAL or UNSATISFACTORY ratings no earlier than 90 days, but not later than 1 year, following the initial inspection. The re-inspection should not be conducted before the HQ USAFE staff replies to the unit's corrective actions and has concurred the problem areas are fixed. For NSI/JSSI, comply with AFI 90-201, Chapter 3).

2.20.2.1. (Added) HQ USAFE/IG may accomplish a limited re-inspection for areas rated overall Satisfactory with serious deficiencies in significant program elements or functions regardless of grades. The decision to conduct the re-inspection and the scope will be determined by the IG, coordinated with the appropriate HQ USAFE staff agency and approved by the USAFE/CV.

2.20.3. (Added) Depending on initial evaluation results, a unit's re-inspection may or may not be limited in scope by evaluating only those findings causing the failure (e.g. limited ORI (LORI)). Re-inspected areas can receive a rating no higher than Satisfactory.

2.21. (Added) Exemptions. To become exempt from any type of an inspection, units should process waiver requests through their respective NAF and HQ USAFE functional staff for action and subsequent coordination with HQ USAFE/IG. The Commander Numbered Air Force (NAF/CC) is the authority for their respective gained units. The USAFE/CV is the final approval authority for UCIs and ORIs. NSI/JSSI exemptions require out-of-command approval. Although not all inclusive, consider the following circumstances for requesting exemptions:

2.21.1. (Added) A unit undergoing a HHQ-directed reorganization.

2.21.2. (Added) A major unit mission change (e.g. nuclear to conventional).

2.21.3. (Added) Real-world contingency deployments or commitments.

2.21.4. (Added) Weapon system modification or conversion requiring extensive training of personnel and/or modifying maintenance procedures.

2.21.5. (Added) Other circumstances that may affect a unit's capability to fully perform its mission.

2.22. (Added) Multimedia Support. Inspected units will develop a letter (as required) for use by inspectors, allowing them to take photos/video on the installation. Munitions Support Squadrons (MUNSS) will coordinate photo/video authorization for inspectors with the host nation. Unit photos/video will be used for the out-brief presentation.

2.22.1. (Added) Requirements. Inspected wings may be tasked to provide multimedia inspection support in accordance with **Attachment 12 (Added)**.

2.23. (Added) Observers. Commanders of units being inspected, in coordination with the IG Team Chief, must approve all inspection observers. Upon initial unit commander approval, the requesting unit forwards the request to HQ USAFE/IG, to gain final observer coordination. The message identifies observers by rank, name, base assigned, and functional area. Observers are responsible for arranging their own billeting, transportation support, Entry Authorization List (EAL), and site authorization. The inspected unit provides observers with identifying badges (not yellow). Prior to inspection start, observers receive a ground rules briefing by the IG Team Chief or designated representative.

2.23.1. (Added) The objective of having observers present during an inspection is to provide individuals in leadership positions a perspective on the general conduct and flow of the inspection. It is not a tool to gain insight into a specific inspector's approach or focus. Observers must not interfere with the conduct of any portion of the inspection. Observers will be directed to depart if conflict arises.

2.24. (Added) Public Affairs. Some information pertaining to inspections may be included in base newspapers or other internal information channels, unless information is classified or identifies unit vulnerabilities and is in accordance with AFI 35-101, *Public Affairs Policies and Procedures*. For ORIs, commanders of inspected units may authorize the publication of five-tier ratings of major evaluated areas in public access media to include the base paper. Five-tier ratings are defined as outstanding, excellent, satisfactory, marginal, and unsatisfactory. Major evaluated areas are defined as Intitial Response, Employment, Mission Support and Ability to Survive and Operate. Public release of sub-area ratings or any other data is prohibited. Report findings and excerpts may be disclosed in non-public access publications designed to officially disseminate the results within the command. Commanders will ensure all personnel safeguard the privileged nature of inspection reports. For Nuclear Surety Inspections and Defense Nuclear Agency Inspections, no public or non-public release of scores or data is authorized beyond that required by this regulation.

2.25. (Added) Associate Inspectors (AI). HQ USAFE directorates, NAFs, and wings will identify personnel to assist in inspections when requested. HQ USAFE/IG will provide temporary duty (TDY) funds for AIs.

2.25.1. (Added) Qualifications. Associate Inspectors are held to the same standards as the team they are augmenting and must meet the following requirements:

2.25.1.1. (Added) Associate Inspectors should be a master sergeant or above; other ranks and civilians will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

2.25.1.2. (Added) Secret clearance as a minimum, or as appropriate for the functional area.

2.25.1.3. (Added) No Unfavorable Information File (UIF) established or pending.

2.25.1.4. (Added) A recognized functional expert by superiors.

2.25.1.5. (Added) Demonstrates exceptional interpersonal skills.

3.1. The Inspector General (HQ USAFE/IG) evaluates all US Units and Host Nation Strike Units with a nuclear capability.

3.2.4. (Added) Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection (INSI) Scheduling. Units will request inspection dates through the appropriate NAF to the Weapons Safety Division (HQ USAFE/SEW) and HQ USAFE/IGI. All organizations planning to change use of, modify, or build new maintenance or storage facilities affecting nuclear weapons or surety will coordinate these actions through the wing weapons safety manager (WSM). After WSM review, coordinate package through the appropriate base agencies to determine if changes affect nuclear surety or operations prior to submitting to the installation commander for approval. Once installation commander's approval is obtained, forward the package via parent wing, (Munitions Support Squadron) and NAF to HQ USAFE/SEW, HQ USAFE/A4W, or Security Force Operations Division (HQ USAFE/SFO), as appropriate, to determine if changes or new construction require an INSI.

3.3.1.1.3. (Added) The Joint Safety and Security Inspection (JSSI) are normally conducted in conjunction with NSIs for both United States and Host Nation and is not to exceed 18 months from completion of the last successful JSSI.

3.5.1.1. For units rated "Unsatisfactory" and not re-inspected on the spot to at least a "Marginal," the HQ USAFE staff and NAF staff will ensure weapons are maintained in a safe and secure environment until Critical Deficiencies are resolved. The HQ USAFE staff, in coordination with COMUSAFE, will limit unit operations as deemed necessary based on the area and nature of critical deficiencies. Limitations are

only removed after the unit demonstrates the capability to provide safe, secure, and reliable weapons with successful completion of a follow-up NSI or Limited Nuclear Surety Inspection (LNSI). Key IG team members may remain temporarily on-site to monitor the "Unsatisfactory" area until relieved by HQ USAFE staff members.

3.5.1.1.1. (Added) The following actions are required after discovering "Unsatisfactory" or potentially "Unsatisfactory" conditions:

3.5.1.1.1.1. (Added) The Inspection Team Chief notifies the Directorate of Logistics (HQ USAFE/A4). In addition, the Inspection Team Chief will notify COMUSAFE and USAFE/CV. The Team Chief then provides a memorandum, classified if required, to the unit commander stating the reason for the "Unsatisfactory" finding. This memorandum requires a written reply on corrective actions. The unit commander notifies the wing (MUNSS), NAF, and the appropriate HQ USAFE staff directorate and informs them of the "Unsatisfactory" finding. The unit commander provides a written reply to the Inspection Team Chief within 24 hours of receiving notification of condition, addressing corrective actions and or mitigating circumstances.

3.5.1.1.1.2. (Added) . The Team Chief assesses the unit commander's written response and makes the final decision to withdraw the finding, decrease its severity or leave it at the critical level. The written response may lead the Team Chief to reclassify or reword the finding, identify an outside agency to be responsible, or determine if a more systemic problem exists.

3.5.1.2.1. Identify NSI and JSSI mission-impacting deficiencies as either Critical or Major. Include in all Critical and Major deficiencies a narrative root cause and narrative impact statement with respect to safety, security, or reliability of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons systems.

3.5.1.2.3. (Added) Additional Inspection Grading Criteria:

3.5.1.2.3.1. (Added) Deficiencies. The presence of a "Major Deficiency" in a single area or sub-area precludes a rating higher than "Marginal" for that area or sub-area.

3.5.1.2.3.2. (Added) The HQ USAFE/IG identifies deficiencies not affecting safety, security, or reliability of nuclear weapons in an attachment to the NSI/JSSI report. The identified items do not influence the NSI/JSSI ratings and the attachment will not contain ratings.

3.5.1.2.3.3. (Added) Repeat Deficiencies. A deficiency is considered a "Repeat" when it is the same reported deficiency in the unit's prior inspection report.

3.5.2.1.2.13. (Added) Evaluate Strike and Prime Nuclear Airlift Force (PNAF) aircrew training related to nuclear operations.

3.5.2.1.2.14. (Added) Evaluate munitions control and surety related quality assurance program elements.

3.5.2.2. This area is divided into two-rated areas: Weapons Maintenance and Weapons Loading.

3.5.2.2.6.3. (Added) Weapons Loading. Evaluate a maximum of 50 percent of unit nuclear-certified load crews. Additionally, a maximum of 25 percent of qualified load crews will demonstrate capability to perform aircraft certification or nuclear weapons checks. Evaluate armament systems section on the ability to provide safe and reliable weapons release systems. Task a maximum of 25 percent of the unit's primary assigned aircraft for evaluation. Evaluate failures by reviewing the weapons release pass rate and maintenance history for the aircraft in question. If aircraft fails reliability check after download, it will indicate mission failure. Use this information to determine the rating. Include the MUNSS load monitor program as specified in ACO Directive 75-5, Training in Nuclear Weapons Loading, in this area.

3.5.2.4. This area is divided into two rated sub areas: Condition of stockpile and Storage and maintenance facilities. Condition of stockpile will include AFI 90-201 paragraph 3.5.2.4.1 thru 3.5.2.4.7. Storage and maintenance facilities will include paragraph 3.5.2.4.8. thru 3.5.2.4.17.

3.5.2.4.4. Evaluate weapons storage and security system (WS3) code module control, storage, and handling, as applicable. Keep weapons storage vault openings to a minimum. Consolidate and perform all inspection requirements during vault openings for maintenance activities when available.

3.5.2.5. For United States MUNSS, title this area “CUSTODY”.

3.5.2.6.5. Evaluate the US fire fighting force to ensure adequate personnel are available, properly trained, and suitably equipped. Examine notification, alarm monitoring, plans and procedures. Ascertain availability and serviceability of fire-fighting equipment to support daily and contingency operations.

3.5.2.6.6. (Added) At a MUNSS, evaluate parent wing weapons safety and nuclear surety program support as appropriate.

3.5.2.8.7. (Added) Evaluate military personnel support to include Directorate of Personnel (HQ USAFE/A1) and Command Surgeon (HQ USAFE/SG), parent military treatment facility, base, and squadron level Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) monitors with respect to the quality of training, guidance, and information being provided to unit commanders, unit monitors, and base support agencies.

3.5.2.8.8. (Added) The MUNSS PRP evaluation is a programmatic evaluation of PRP as it is managed as a squadron level program. Parent wing support will also be inspected. This programmatic evaluation will emphasize the administrative and professional support (medical, rehabilitative, counseling, etc.) provided by the unit's parent wing. Administrative management of PRP, will be evaluated, including assistance given to the unit commander and the PRP monitors, computer products, and Personnel Records. An evaluation of medical services will include screening of the entire health records group, IDMT PRP training, and PRP notification procedures. The unit's administration of PRP will be evaluated, including commander involvement, initial record screening, medical support, access denial procedures, decertification, monitoring, training, and overall PRP knowledge of assigned personnel.

3.5.2.10. Except for INSI, inspect Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) units in conjunction with the parent unit or supported unit.

3.5.2.11. Rated sub-areas include:

3.5.2.11.1. (Added) Aircrew Performance:

3.5.2.11.1.1. (Added) Evaluate strike aircrews’ ability to comply with nuclear control order procedures. Aircrew performance includes evaluation of areas according to ACO Directive 75-6, Special Weapons Training for Strike Aircrew.

3.5.2.11.1.2. (Added) Units will provide the HQ USAFE/IG operations inspector with a current listing of assigned combat mission-ready strike aircrews. The unit will provide a listing of aircrew availability during the inspection period. The HQ USAFE/IG operations inspector will select 25 percent of available aircrews (minimum of three aircrews) from each strike squadron for weapon acceptance evaluation.

3.5.2.11.1.3. (Added) Each strike squadron tasked with an aircraft generation will have an aircrew accomplish a weapon acceptance evaluation during the generation. The IG Team will evaluate at least one acceptance through engine start, mission abort before taxi, and return of weapon to custodial agent. Remaining evaluations will be accomplished as off-line acceptances. Evaluate strike aircrew ability to preflight and accept a loaded weapon system.

3.5.2.11.1.4. (Added) Aircrews will be chosen from each strike squadron for certification demonstration, and for simulator evaluations. The unit will provide the operations inspector(s) with the unit letter of "Xs" showing aircrew qualifications and Air Force Aviation Resource Management System or computer-generated product showing nuclear surety training dates, certification dates and USAFE Emergency Action File (EAF) Volume I training dates.

3.5.2.11.1.5. (Added) Evaluate unit certification program. The unit will convene a certification board for each strike squadron according to AFI 10-419, *Dual Capable Aircraft, Nuclear Training, Planning and Operational Procedures, F-15E/F-16 (Classified)*, and the USAFE EAF Volume I for evaluation. One aircrew from each strike squadron will demonstrate a simulator strike mission with a strike-qualified instructor. The HQ USAFE/IG operations inspector selects the simulator aircrew and the unit may select the strike-qualified instructor for the simulator strike mission.

3.5.2.11.1.6. (Added) Administer a composite test to all available strike aircrew. Strike units submit a 100-question Master Question File (MQF) on nuclear surety and safety and strike-related aircraft systems knowledge to HQ USAFE/IGO no later than 30 days prior to the inspection. This MQF will include a 20-question section on the two-person concept. The HQ USAFE/IG operations inspector will develop a 50-question test, which includes 10 questions on two-person control (TPC). Of the 50-question test, 45 questions will be taken from the unit MQF and 5 questions will be provided by HQ USAFE/IGO. The passing score is 85 percent or above. Aircrew can miss no more than one two-person concept question.

3.5.2.11.1.7. (Added) Evaluate training records and academic programs. Evaluate all required publications for currency and availability.

3.5.2.11.1.8. (Added) Credit for the simulator strike mission and aircrew test may be given by HQ USAFE/IGI if NATO has successfully administered these two requirements in the previous six months during a NATO Strike Evaluation. Grades and comments should be included in the JSSI report.

3.5.2.11.2. Command Post Operations. Evaluate Command Post (CP) controllers' ability to process, authenticate, and disseminate nuclear control EAM. Conduct scripted evaluations and testing to assess controller knowledge and proficiency in emergency action procedures. Inspectors will administer a closed book emergency actions test to all available certified controllers in accordance with USEUCOM EAP Volume I, *Emergency Action Procedures*, and the USAFE Master Training Plan (MTP). Evaluate CP controller's ability to compile, process, and transmit nuclear surety-related operational reports to higher headquarters.

3.5.2.12.3. Phase 3 tests the United States capability to respond to a nuclear accident scenario and report actions. Phases need not be accomplished concurrently or in specific order. Exercises will be evaluated in accordance with **Attachment 9 (Added)**.

3.5.2.12.3.3. Additional references include ACO 80-6/ED 60-12.

3.5.2.12.3.2. Only report in this area those items not already covered in other rated areas or unique to the execution of the emergency response.

3.5.2.13. Evaluate planning and training. Administer a 10-question Two Person Control (TPC) test, based on duty position requirements, to all available certified emergency action (EA) controllers, TPC custodians and alternates, and Positive Control Material authorized aircrew members. Individual passing score is 90 percent.

3.5.2.14. (Added) COMMUNICATIONS. Assess timeliness of response and adequacy of maintenance and repair actions for Intrusion Detection System (IDS) (not applicable where NATO IDS is installed).

Evaluate availability of land mobile radio systems and dial telephones supporting security operations. Evaluate maintenance and operations support for ALL EA Communications systems.

3.5.2.15. (Added) Aircraft Generation (US MOBS): The inspectors assess specific tasks performed during aircraft generation, e.g. weapons loading and reliability checks. The written report will address actions or findings noted during aircraft generation within the applicable rated inspection areas.

3.5.2.15.1. (Added) Units are required to generate one aircraft per certified strike squadron. Aircraft generation commences with a fully mission-capable aircraft positioned and ready to be loaded. All facets of the generation are subject to evaluation. Units will demonstrate all procedures up to prelaunch, taxi, aircraft recovery and download.

3.5.2.15.2. (Added) Inspectors evaluate aircraft weapons reliability checks immediately following download. If for some reason the reliability checks cannot be accomplished, the unit restricts access to the aircraft until such time as the checks can be performed.

3.8.1. HQ USAFE/IGI is the Corrective Action Report Status (CARS) program monitor and is responsible for processing all DTRA inspection report replies to HQ AFSC/SEW.

3.9.3.1. (Added) Corrective Action Response:

3.9.3.1.1. (Added) Nuclear Surety and Joint Safety and Security Reports. For NSI/JSSI reports, the commanders will forward corrective action replies as a separate and distinct package from DTRA corrective action replies. Inspected units are required to reply to all identified findings with a description of corrective action.

3.9.3.1.2. (Added) DTRA and NSI/JSSI Reports. For DTRA and NSI/JSSI reports, HQ USAFE/IGI will assign a suspense tracking number to each finding.

3.9.3.1.3. (Added) Processing DTRA and NSI/JSSI Reports. For formal DTRA and NSI/JSSI reports, units will process replies as follows:

3.9.3.1.3.1. (Added) . Forward unit replies through all intermediate headquarters to HQ USAFE/IGI.. Send an information copy to HQ USAFE/SEW. HQ USAFE/IGI will coordinate responses with appropriate directorates prior to closure.

3.9.3.1.3.2. (Added) The inspected unit must reply in writing within 5 workdays after the formal inspection report is received. The unit submits follow-up status every 30 calendar days until all findings are resolved. Replies will be identified as initial, follow-up, or final. For final replies, the inspected unit corrective action response must have HQ USAFE/IGI concurrence prior to considering the item closed. HQ USAFE/IGI ensures the appropriate USAFE staff directorate, as well as HQ USAFE/SEW, is consulted on corrective actions.

3.9.3.1.4. (Added) Status and Progress of Unit Corrective Action. HQ USAFE/IG and HQ USAFE/A4 will periodically present status and progress of unit corrective action to COMUSAFE and USAFE/CV.

3.9.3.1.5. (Added) Host Nation. For host nation specific issues, process corrective actions as prescribed by the applicable service-to-service Joint Technical Agreements.

3.9.4.1. List all deficiencies under one of the 14 areas in paragraph **3.5.2.**

3.10. (Added) **Inspection Support Requirements:**

3.10.1. Upon arrival of HQ USAFE/IG inspectors, units will provide the following:

3.10.2. Two-person control access letters held by the command post, operations plans division, and COMSEC account manager.

3.10.3. Complete listing of all initial and recurring nuclear surety training.

3.10.4. Complete listing of all weapons maintenance tasks and personnel certifications.

3.10.5. One copy of each assigned units Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) suspension logs. One decollated copy of the PRP management roster, printed with page breaks between each unit, for each PRP inspector and a full alpha listing of PRP coded individuals.

3.10.6. A copy of the unit emergency evacuation and command disablement plans.

3.10.7. Blotters, Weapons Storage and Security System (WS3) event files, AFTO Forms 781A, **Maintenance Discrepancy and Work Document**, pertaining to sensors systems, dating back 90 days from the day prior to inspection start. Use a highlighter or tabs to indicate entries reflecting WS3 Alarm Response Team/Interior Security Response Team (ART/ISRT), Augmentation Force (AF) and Response Force (RF) exercises. Also, provide documentation reflecting the most recent Reinforcing Capability exercise and Augmentation Force ammunition re-supply.

3.10.8. One copy of all wing, base, or MUNSS instructions applicable to a surety inspection. Ensure applicable United States European Command (USEUCOM) directives, the Installation Security Plan/Site Security and Defense Plan, and Host nation surety plans are available upon request.

3.10.9. Flight or element duty schedules for the period of the inspection.

3.10.10. The IG may assign individuals or request assignment of individuals as “Trusted Agents” to participate in scenarios and demonstrations. Personnel provided to HQ USAFE/IG as a Trusted Agent should be knowledgeable of local procedures.

3.11. (Added) **JOINT SAFETY AND SECURITY INSPECTION:**

3.11.1. Joint Safety and Security Inspection (JSSI)-USAFE NATO Custodial Units and User Nation Strike Wings. Normally conduct the JSSI in conjunction with the custodial unit’s NSI. The JSSI will also include the NSI for non-US units, loading crew standardization checks and aircrew certification and standardization requirements as stated in ACO Directive 80-6, Volume 2, Part II, EUCOM Directive 60-12. The JSSI is not solely a rated inspection of the host nation; it includes portions of the custodial unit’s responsibilities.

3.11.2. Inspection Objectives and Authority. The objective of the JSSI is to assure high standards of safety, security, and reliability in operations involving US weapons and associated equipment. Authority for this inspection is contained in service-to-service joint technical arrangements (JTA)(Peabody) and ACO Directive 80-6, Volume 2, Part II, EUCOM Directive 60-12. Inspection requirements are contained in the aforementioned documents, TO 11N-25-1 and AFI 90-201.

3.11.3. Inspection Policy. Conduct a JSSI in conjunction with NSIs prior to positioning weapons and after positioning at intervals not to exceed 18 months. Limited notice and limited in scope NSIs may be performed. Prior to notification of inspection, HQ USAFE/IG will coordinate with the appropriate host nation MOD and MUNSS when the inspection involves the host nation.

3.11.4. Inspection Reporting:

3.11.4.1. Formal Report Distribution. Distribute formal reports according to ACO Directive 80-6, Volume 2, Part II, EUCOM Directive 60-12. Both the US and host nation inspection team chiefs sign this

report. When the JSSI is conducted in conjunction with the NSI, attach a copy of the JSSI report to the NSI formal report.

3.11.4.2. Message Report. If an unreliable weapon or weapons system or an unsafe or insecure environment for nuclear weapons exists, send an Immediate Precedence message to the addressees specified in ACO Directive 80-6, Volume 2, Part II, EUCOM Directive 60-12. HQ USAFE message address is HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//CC/CV/A1/A3/A4/SE/SF/IG/AFEUR?//.

3.11.4.3. JSSI reports will specifically address the deviation program as required by ACO Directive 80-6, EUCOM Directive 60-12.

3.11.5. JSSI Team Composition and Qualifications. The team is composed of a team chief and inspectors from HQ USAFE/IG and the host nation (1 Ops, 1 Log, 1 Force Protection Host Nation Inspector as a minimum). The host nation team chief and members are participating members of the IG inspection team and are under the direction of the IG Team Chief during the JSSI. Both team chiefs will be familiar with all aspects of nuclear surety inspection requirements.

3.11.5.1. The host nation team chief and members will:

3.11.5.1.1. Have appropriate security clearances.

3.11.5.1.2. Will not be a member of the unit being inspected.

3.11.6. Inspection Procedures:

3.11.6.1. The custodial unit commander, in coordination with the host nation wing commander, is responsible for safety of personnel and security of resources. If an actual emergency occurs during any exercise, the exercise will be terminated and personnel will respond to the emergency.

3.11.6.2. Inspectors are authorized to carry cameras and take photographs/video in all areas approved by the host nation wing commander. To avoid confusion and delay, notify all wing and custodial unit personnel of this authorization.

3.11.6.3. HQ USAFE/IG will follow host nation rules and regulations governing photography/video of facilities, equipment, and resources. Provide photos/video to host nation personnel for security classification when requested.

3.11.6.4. Host Nation inspectors will be listed under the associate inspector EAL. Host Nation identification credentials will be utilized to verify information contained on the EAL.

3.11.7. Criteria and Ratings:

3.11.7.1. Determine ratings using criteria specified in TO 11N-25-l, AFI 90-201, USAFE Supplement, ACO Directive 80-6, Volume 2, Part II, EUCOM Directive 60-12, ACO Directive 75-5, *Training in Nuclear Weapons Loading*, and ACO Directive 75-6, *Special Weapons Training for Strike Aircrew* as applicable.

3.11.7.2. Use the same rating or grading system for the JSSI as the NSI.

3.11.7.3. Deficiencies not attributable to the inspected unit will not affect the area or overall ratings provided the problems do not violate the pass or fail criteria. Use the Satisfactory and Support Unsatisfactory rating as appropriate. The final decision on the overall rating for the JSSI rests with the HQ USAFE/IG Team Chief in consultation with the host nation team chief.

3.11.7.4. During concurrent NSI/JSSI, inspections use NSI evaluations to satisfy the inspection requirements of the US custodial unit for the JSSI.

3.12. (Added) **JSSI INSPECTION AREAS:**

3.12.1. Aircraft Generation:

3.12.1.1. HQ USAFE/IG will evaluate the unit's capability to integrate as a team to generate and recover strike aircraft. Host Nation/MUNSS units will be required to generate one aircraft per certified strike squadron. Commence aircraft generation with a fully mission-capable aircraft positioned to accept asset. Evaluate all facets of the generation.

3.12.1.2. Evaluate aircraft weapon system reliability and certification checkout immediately following downloads. If the reliability check cannot be accomplished, restrict the aircraft from access to anyone until such time as the check can be performed. If the aircraft fails the reliability check after download, it will indicate mission failure. HQ USAFE/IG will check additional aircraft to determine aircraft reliability.

3.12.1.3. Assess specific tasks performed during aircraft generation against the applicable sub-areas, i.e. weapons loading and release procedures. Address actions or findings noted during aircraft generation within the applicable inspection areas.

3.12.2. JSSI Rated Areas. The following areas will be inspected, when applicable, and reported in the JSSI report.

3.12.2.1. Management and Administration Evaluate:

3.12.2.1.1. Host nation directives and technical publications applicable to the scope of the JSSI. A check shall be made to ensure the host unit is not in receipt of unauthorized publications pertaining to nuclear weapons.

3.12.2.1.2. Joint United States S/Host nation unit standard operating procedures/ plans/ instructions implementing United States requirements in the areas of security, safety, nuclear accident/incident response, non-violent disablement, emergency evacuation and logistic movement.

3.12.2.1.3. Control and handling of classified plans, manuals, records, reports and components directly associated with the scope of the JSSI.

3.12.2.2. Command and Control. Evaluate the timeliness and accuracy of message processing, authentication, and release procedures in response to simulated EAM. Assess the dissemination and dispatching of crews for respective tasks. Evaluate coordination between United States and host nation command centers.

3.12.2.3. Capability to Provide Weapons to the Strike Unit. Evaluate the capability to store and maintain weapons in approved storage structures and provide proper configurations. Evaluate custodial responsibilities and the technical proficiency of weapon maintenance and load monitor personnel during breakout and aircraft loading operations. Inspect the availability, serviceability, certification and calibration of required tools, test, and handling equipment.

3.12.2.4. Aircraft Configuration and Certification. Evaluate aircraft certification crew proficiency, system knowledge, and adherence to checklist procedures. Inspect the availability, serviceability, certification, and calibration status of loading tools, test, and handling equipment. Examine the status of strike unit aircraft release system configurations. Evaluate at least two aircraft release system certification operations. Evaluate coordination between load crew and load monitors.

3.12.2.5. Load Crew Proficiency. Evaluate capability of load crews to safely and reliably load committed weapons. Evaluate crew control and coordination, adherence to checklist procedures, and adherence to the two-person concept. Inspect the availability, serviceability, certification, and calibration status of loading tools, test, and handling equipment. Evaluate a maximum of 50 percent of unit nuclear-certified load crews. Evaluate coordination between load crew and load monitors. Evaluate in accordance with ACO Directive 75-5, *Training in Nuclear Weapons Loading*.

3.12.2.6. Aircrew Performance.

3.12.2.6.1. The JSSI aircrew performance evaluation will be in accordance with ACO Directive 75-6, *Special Weapons Training for Strike Aircrews* and ACO Directive 80-6, Volume 2, Part II, EUCOM Directive 60-12. Units will provide the HQ USAFE/IG operations inspector with a current listing of assigned combat mission-ready strike aircrews. The unit will provide a listing of aircrew availability during the inspection period. The HQ USAFE/IG operations inspector will select 25 percent of available aircrews (minimum of three aircrews) from each strike squadron for weapon acceptance evaluation.

3.12.2.6.2. Each strike squadron tasked with an aircraft generation will have an aircrew accomplish a weapon acceptance evaluation during the generation. Evaluate at least one acceptance through engine start, mission abort before taxi, and return of weapon to custodial agent. Remaining evaluations will be accomplished as off-line acceptances. Evaluate strike aircrew ability to preflight and accept a loaded weapon system in accordance with applicable technical orders, nuclear safety rules, and HHQ directives.

3.12.2.6.3. One aircrew from each strike squadron will demonstrate a simulator strike mission with a strike-qualified instructor. The HQ USAFE/IG operations inspector will select the simulator aircrew and the unit may select the strike-qualified instructor for the simulator strike mission.

3.12.2.6.4. HQ USAFE/IG will administer a composite test to all available strike aircrew members. Strike units will submit a 100-question MQF on nuclear surety and safety and strike-related aircraft systems knowledge to HQ USAFE/IGI not later than 30 days prior to the inspection. This MQF will include a 20-question section on two-person concept. The operations inspector will develop a 50-question test which includes 10 questions on TPC. Forty-five questions are taken from the unit MQF and five questions will be provided by the operations inspector. Passing score is 85 percent; aircrew can miss no more than one two-person concept question.

3.12.2.6.5. HQ USAFE/IG will evaluate the unit certification program, training records and academic programs. Evaluate all required publications for currency and availability. Include all applicable TOs and checklists for weapon delivery.

3.12.2.7. Safety. The host/user nation will be evaluated to ensure the adequacy of the following:

3.12.2.7.1. Compliance with the Two-Person Concept.

3.12.2.7.2. Compliance with safety requirements and precautions specified in pertinent and applicable directives with regard to nuclear weapons safety and the weapons system safety rules.

3.12.2.7.3. Evaluate the fire-fighting force to ensure adequate personnel are available, properly trained, and suitably equipped. Examine notification, alarm monitoring, plans and procedures. Assess availability and serviceability of fire-fighting equipment to support daily and contingency operations. Evaluate compliance with ELO-1, *Host Nation Fire Fighting Guidance*, ACO Directive 80-6 Volume II, Part II/ EUCOM Directive 60-12 and host nation standards.

3.12.2.8. Personnel Reliability. Evaluate the required standards of reliability for personnel as required by ACO Directive 80-6, Volume 2, Part II, EUCOM Directive 60-12. Accomplish by interviewing the host unit program manager to ensure only reliable personnel are involved in weapons and security functions. Evaluate how individuals are selected for duty and what the unit does to ensure individual reliability on a continuing basis. Satisfactory is the highest rating this area can receive.

3.12.2.9. Host Nation Nuclear Certified Equipment (NCE). Evaluate the host nation's capability to provide safe and serviceable equipment and vehicles and maintain those vehicles and equipment according to the applicable directives and technical data.

3.12.2.10. Security. Ensure security forces are trained, equipped, and exercised in accordance with ACO Directive 80-6, Volume 2, Part II, EUCOM Directive 60-12. Evaluate to ensure facilities, equipment, and communications comply with US and NATO standards in accordance with ACO Directive 80-6, Volume 2, Part II, EUCOM Directive 60-12. Review sufficient data to determine the unit’s ability to carry out its day-to-day mission. The historical data includes, but is not limited to, security reinforcement exercises, i.e. response force (RF), augmentation force (AF), and reinforcement capability (RC). Assess force composition, ability to meet required response times, and tactical deployment. Ensure security forces are adequate to protect the vault storage area and plans provide the most effective defensive arrangements. Assess physical security aids to ensure compliance with standards. Ensure any deviations to ACO Directive 80-6, Volume 2, Part II, EUCOM Directive 60-12 are identified and approved by appropriate authority.

3.12.2.11. Condition of Facilities. Evaluate the host’s maintenance and management of essential facilities, roads, grounds, and utilities as they support the safety, security, storage, movement, and maintenance of weapons.

3.12.2.12. Emergency Response. Evaluate United States/host nation response to a peacetime overt attack to determine effectiveness of resources used to defend against attacks on areas where War Reserve (WR) weapons or weapon systems may be located. Use realistic scenarios based on current MAJCOM threat assessment and Major Command (MAJCOM) or locally devised exercise scenarios. ***NOTE:*** WR weapons will not be used in exercise scenarios. The focus of this exercise is to measure effectiveness of United States/host nation execution of recapture and nuclear accident response plans. To the maximum extent possible, responses will be performance based. The exercise will be evaluated in three phases:

3.12.2.12.1. Phase 1 evaluates United States' capability to successfully delay or deny access to weapons and will include reporting actions.

3.12.2.12.2. Phase 2 evaluates the United States' capability to plan and execute recapture and recovery of weapons and report follow-up actions.

3.12.2.12.3. Phase 3 evaluates the United States' capability to respond to nuclear accident scenario and report actions.

3.12.2.12.4. Phases need not be accomplished concurrently or in specific order.

3.12.2.12.5. Exercises will be evaluated using criteria in AFI 90-201, paragraphs 3.5.2.12.3.1 through 3.5.2.12.3.3. All exercises will be planned and executed in accordance with **Attachment 9 (Added)**.

3.13. (Added) **Simulations/Deviations.** See **Attachment 11 (Added)** for standard simulations/deviations.

4.8. Forms Adopted: AF Form 673, **Request to Issue Publication**; AF Form 847, **Recommendations for Change of Publication**; AF Form 1042, **Medical Recommendation for Flying or Special Operational Duty**; AF Form 1480B, **Adult Preventive and Chronic Care Flowsheet Continuation Sheet;** AFTO Form 781A, **Maintenance Discrepancy and Work Document;** DD Form 1387-2, **Special Handling Data/Certification;** DD Form 2766**, Adult Preventive and Chronic Care Flowsheet;** SF Form 88**, Report of Medical Examination.**

A5.1. Functional Inspection Guides (FIG), published by USAFE Staff Directorates, contain the specific criteria required to implement this Attachment.

A5.2.1.3. (Added) The HQ USAFE/IG will evaluate the following additional areas under Command and Control:

A5.2.1.3.1. (Added) Alert Recall

A5.2.1.3.2. (Added) OPSEC/Communications Security (COMSEC) Procedures

A5.2.1.3.3. (Added) Intelligence

A5.2.1.3.4. (Added) Weather Support

A5.2.1.3.5. (Added) Communications and Information Support.

A5.2.2.1.1. (Added) Aircraft Generation/Regeneration. Evaluation contains all elements associated with the generation/regeneration of the wing's aircraft. Wings with two or more operational squadrons may be tasked to simultaneously generate/regenerate aircraft from more than one squadron. At least one squadron will be tasked for deployment (simulated or actual) and regeneration.

A5.2.2.1.1.1. (Added) Number/Timing of Generated/Regenerated Aircraft. The number/timing of aircraft generated/regenerated according to the DEPORD/ATO is critical. The tasked squadron(s) will generate/regenerate enough primary and spare aircraft to support tasking.

A5.2.2.1.2. (Added) Aircraft Deployment. Units will demonstrate their ability to deploy to a forward operating location. The IG will evaluate the capability of a unit to deploy its generated aircraft and the procedures used during deployment operations. Deployment mission may include aerial refueling. Aircraft unable to complete aerial refueling due to refueling system malfunction or pilot inability will not be considered deployed.

A5.2.2.2.1. (Added) Aircraft Maintenance. The aircraft maintenance function will be evaluated on its ability to manage and control assigned resources, the content and use of generation plans, technical data and safety compliance, supply support, munitions support, weapons loading activities, combat capability of generated aircraft, and quality of aircraft maintenance.

A5.5.3.2. (Added) ***NOTE:*** Collective protection criteria applies only to Incirlik AB, Turkey.

A6.1. Functional Inspection Guides (FIG), published by USAFE Staff Directorates, contain the specific criteria, required to implement this Attachment.

A6.3.6.1. Conduct Full Spectrum Threat Response Exercise (FSTR) in accordance with **Attachment 9 (Added)**.

Attachment 1

GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION

References

AFI 10-201, *Status of Resources and Training System*

AFMAN 10-206 and USAFE Sup, *Operational Reporting*

AFI 10-211, *Civil Engineering Contingency Response Planning*

AFI 10-212, *Air Base Operability Program*

AFI 10-419, *Dual Capable Aircraft, Nuclear Training, Planning and Operational Procedures, F-15E/ F-16 (Classified)*

AFI 10-2501, *Full Spectrum Threat Response (FSTR) Planning and Operations*

AFI 10-2502, *USAF Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Threat Planning and Response Handbook*

AFI 31-207, *Arming and Use of Force by Air Force Personnel*

AFI 32-4002 and USAFEI 32-4002, *Hazardous Material Emergency Planning and Response Program*

AFMAN 32-4004, *Emergency Response Operations*

AFMAN 32-4005, *Personnel Protection and Attack Actions*

AFPD 33-2, *Information Protection*

AFMAN 33-326, *Preparing Official Communications*

AFI 33-360, Volume 1, *Air Force Content Management Program -Publications*

AFI 51-401, *Training and Reporting to Ensure Compliance with the Laws of Armed Conflict*

AFI 91-112, *Safety Rules for US Strike Aircraft*

AFI 91-113, *Safety Rules for Non-US NATO Strike Aircraft*

ACO Directive 75-5, *Training In Nuclear Weapons Loading*

ACO Directive 75-6, *Special Weapons Training for Strike Aircrews*

ACO Directive 80-6, Volume 2, Part II, USEUCOM Directive 60-12, *Nuclear Surety Management for the WS3*

USCINCEUR AT/FP OPORD 01-01, *USEUCOM Antiterrorism-Force Protection*

DoD Instruction 2000.12, *DoD Antiterrorism/Force Protection*

DoD Instruction 3150.8-M, *Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures*

ELO-1, *Host Nation Fire Fighting Guidance*

Installation FSTR Plan 10 - 1

Installation WMD Plans/Annexes

Installation Medical contingency Response Plans

JUH-MTF, Joint Users Handbook - *Message Text Format*

Command EOD IED/WMD inspection guide

EUCOM Directive 60-12

USAFE Emergency Action File (EAF) Volume 1

US Air Force EOD WMD CONOPS

US Air Force EOD ARTS CONOPS

USEUCOM Emergency Action Procedures Volume 1, dated 01 May 2002 (Classified)

Local contingency plans and checklists

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACCA—Aircrew Chemical Control Area

ACDE—Aircrew Chemical Defense Ensemble

ACO—Allied Command Operations

AF—Augmentation Force

AFS—Air Force Specialty Code

AFWUS—Air Force Wide UTC Availability and Tasking Summary

AGE—Aerospace Ground Equipment

AI—Associate Inspectors

AOR—Area of Responsibility

ASM—Aircraft Sustainability Model

BDOC—Base Defense Operations Center

BSP—Base X Support Plan

CAT—Crisis Action Team

CBWDE—Chemical biological warfare defense ensemble

CCA—Contamination Control Area

CCGI—Core Compliance Guide Item

CDF—Cargo Deployment Function

CGI—Compliance Guide Item

CE—Civil Engineer

CED—Contingency Exercise Deployment

COMSEC—Communications Security

COMPES—Contingency Operation Mobility Planning and Execution System

COMPUSEC—Computer Security

COMUSAFE—Commander USAFE

CP—Command Post

CWDE—Chemical Warfare Defense Ensemble

DCC—Deployment Control Center Sim/Devs--Simulation/Deviations

DPU—Deployment Processing Unit

DRMD—Deployment Requirements Manning Document

EA—Emergency Action

EAL—Entry Authorization List

EAM—Emergency Action Message

ECM—Electronic Countermeasures

ECP—Entry Control Point

ECS—Expeditionary Combat Support

EET—Exercise Evaluation Team

EF—Euro Flash

ENDEX—End of Exercise

FIG—Functional Implementation Guide

FMC—Fully Mission Capable

FPCON—Force Protection Condition

FWA—Fraud, Waste and Abuse

GSU—Geographically-Separated Unit

HHQ—Higher Headquarters

IED—Improvised Explosive Device

IA—Individual Augmentation

IDP—Installation Deployment Plan

IDS—Intrusion Detection System

IRC—Inspection Record Card

ISP—Installation Security Plan

JOPES—Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

JSSI—Joint Safety and Security Inspection

JTA—Joint Technical Arrangements

LMR—Land Mobile Radio

LMSA—Logistic Module Stand-Alone

LOAC—Law of Armed Conflict

LOGMOD—Logistics Module

MANPER-B—Manpower Personnel-Base level

MESL—Mission Essential Subsystem List

MOB—Main Operating Base

MOC—Maintenance Operations Center

MOD—Ministry of Defense

MPF—Military Personnel Flight

MQF—Master Question File

MQT—Mission Qualification Training

MRE—Meals Ready-to-Eat

MRSP—Mobility Readiness Spares Package

MSK—Mission Support Kit

MTP—Master Training Plan

NAF—Numbered Air Force

NATO—North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NATREP—US National Representative

NCE—Nuclear Certified Equipment

NET—no earlier than

OPORD—Operations Order

OPREP—Operational Report

OSI—Office of Special Investigation

PAL—Permissive Action Link

PDF—Personnel Deployment Function

PERSCO—Personnel Support For Contingency Operations

PHA—Preventive Health Assessment

PMC(M/S)—Partially Mission Capable (Maintenance/Supply)

PNAF—Primary Nuclear Airlift Force

POL—Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants

QAE—Quality Assurance Evaluator

RAV—Readiness Assessment Visits

RC—Reinforcement capability

RF—Response Force

ROE—Rules of Engagement

RST—Reference Start Time

SAV—Staff Assistance Visit

SF—Security Forces

SITREP—Situation Report

SOF—Supervisor of Flying

SORTS—Status of Resource and Training Systems

SPIN—Special Instruction

SRC—Survival Recovery Center

TAC EVAL—Tactical Evaluation

TCO—Transportation Control Officer

TDY—Temporary duty

TPC—Two-person Control

TPFDD—Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data

UCI—Unit Compliance Inspection

UIF—Unfavorable Information File

URC—Universal Release Code

USAFE—United States Air Forces Europe

USEUCOM—United States European Command

USMTF—United States Message Text Format

UTC—Unit Type Code

UXO—Unexploded Ordnance

WLT—Weapons Loading Training

WMD—Weapons of Mass Destruction

WOC—Wing Operations Center

WSM—Weapons Safety Manager

Terms

Aircrew Chemical Control Area (ACCA)—A self-sustaining aircrew-only decontamination control area that minimizes cross contamination to aircrews and is manned by certified aircrew life support specialists.

Aircrew Chemical Defense Ensemble (ACDE)—Individually fitted aircrew-unique chemical protective equipment for the sole purpose of protecting operators flying into and out of a chemically contaminated

environment.

Complies—In compliance with intent of all major aspects of applicable directives. Few if any discrepancies noted. Any discrepancy noted does not impede or limit mission accomplishment and, or result in legal liabilities or penalties.

Complies With Comments—Areas for improvement. In compliance with all major aspects of applicable directives. Deficiencies exist which impede or limit mission accomplishment and/or could potentially result in legal liabilities or penalties.

Crisis Action Team (CAT)—Command and staff personnel assembled to respond to contingency or emergency situations. Battle staff is a synonymous term.

Core Compliance Guide Item (CCGI)—Items identified by HQ USAFE directorates as key result areas for successful mission accomplishment including, but not limited to, items where non-compliance could result in serious injury, loss of life, excessive cost, litigation, or affect system reliability. These requirements may be mandated by law, Executive Order, DoD directive, safety or Air Force and USAFE strategic plans.

Compliance Guide Item (CGI)—Areas that require special vigilance and are important to the overall performance of the unit. Non-compliance would result in some negative impact on mission performance or could result in injury, unnecessary cost, or litigation.

Critical Finding—For NSIs, those which preclude or prevent unit capability to meet a primary surety responsibility as defined in TO 11N-25-1 and AFI 90-201.

Designed Operational Capability (DOC)—A unit DOC is the mission for which a measured unit has been equipped, organized, designed or tasked. While all measured combat, combat support, and combat service support units must have a primary DOC, some units may have more than one DOC based on additional taskings. It serves as a basis for SORTS reporting.

Does Not Comply--Not in compliance —Deficiencies exist that preclude or prevent mission accomplishment. These deficiencies have a high probability to result in significant legal liabilities or penalties, injury, loss of life, excessive cost, litigation, or adverse mission impact.

Force Health Protection (FHP)—Promotion of a healthy, fit, and medically ready force through a continuous health surveillance program which identifies the human as a weapon system and emphasizes disease prevention, environmental surveillance, and health promotion as keys to maintenance and deployment of a robust force.

Forward Operating Base (FOB)—An airfield used to support operations without establishing full support facilities. The base may be used for an extended time period.

Fraud Waste and Abuse (FWA) Item—An actual or potential fraudulent, wasteful, or abusive practice involving government resources (funds, property, materiel, personnel, etc.) as defined in AFI 90-301, Inspector General Complaints.

Functional Implementation Guides—A checklist, published by USAFE Staff Directorates, containing unit level criteria required to implement AFI 90-201 and the USAFE Supplement.

Higher Headquarters Item—Any finding that requires action from a higher level to resolve. These items are written in the appropriate tab of the report and also in the higher headquarters section.

Major Finding—For NSI/JSSI, those deficiencies which impede or limit unit capability to meet a

primary surety responsibility as defined in TO 11N-25-1 and AFI 90-201.

Operations Plan (OPLAN)—Any plan, except for the Single Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP), for the conduct of military operations. Plans are prepared by Combatant Commanders in response to requirements established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by commanders of subordinate command, in response to requirements tasked by the establishing unified commander. Operation plans (OPLAN) are prepared either in the complete format of an OPLAN or as a concept Plan (CONPLAN). An OPLAN can be used for the conduct of joint operation and, or as a basis for development of an operations order. An OPLAN identifies the forces and supplies required to execute the combatant commander's Strategic Concept and a movement schedule of these resources to the theater of operations. The forces and supplies are identifies in time-phased force deployment data (TPFDD) files. OPLANs will include all phases of tasked operations. The plan is prepared with the appropriate annexes, appendixes and TPFDD files as described in the JOPES manuals containing planning policies, procedures and formats.

Prime Nuclear Airlift Force (PNAF) Wing—A USAFE airlift wing with a squadron or squadrons identified to perform programmed logistic airlift of nuclear weapons.

Readiness Criteria (RC)—Areas deemed necessary by functional managers that require special vigilance and are important to the overall performance of the unit. Not adhering to RC could result in some negative impact on mission performance. Standard sentence case is used to identify RCs.

Repeat Finding—A finding reported in the unit's previous inspection report or a recent audit agency report that exists during the current inspection. A repeat finding exists only if the item was a finding in that unit's most recent inspection or audit report.

Safety Violations—Unsafe acts or conditions which result in or, in the judgment of an inspector, could result in, damage to aircraft, equipment and/or injury to personnel.

Simulate—A direction or approval by HQ USAFE/IG to not perform specific actions. When a unit receives an instruction to simulate, it will take all preparatory steps, such as drafting messages, reviewing checklists or instructions and reporting simulated completion to the appropriate authority.

Sortie—An operational flight by one aircraft not to exceed one takeoff and one full-stop landing.

Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS)—The JCS-controlled and automated system which provides authoritative identification, location, and resource information to the National Command Authority and the Joint Staff.

Strengths—Clearly better than satisfactory performance. Particularly good management practices, and efficient and economical procedures are strengths. A statement indicating the unit personnel are doing their job, is not a strength.

Unit Type Code (UTC)—A five-character, alphanumeric code that uniquely identifies each type of unit of the Armed Forces.

Weapon System—A composite of equipment, skills, and techniques that form an instrument of combat. The term includes the aircraft and all of the facilities, equipment, materiel, services and personnel required in an operational environment.

Wing Operations Center (WOC)—Provisional (deployed) wing or group commander's battle staff and executive command and control agency; operationally integrated collection of functional work centers which manage unit-assigned, mission-essential forces and resources needed to generate aircraft, aircrew

loads, and deployable mission support elements at bed-down locations in order to satisfy higher headquarters-directed taskings.

Attachment 9 (Added)

FULL SPECTRUM THREAT RESPONSE EXERCISE/INSPECTION POLICY

A9.1. Concept of Operations. The IG and unit EET will conduct scheduled and no-notice exercises and evaluate the unit's integrated capability to recover from full spectrum threat response (FSTR) scenarios. Scenarios will include, but are not limited to, terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), natural disasters, major accidents, and enemy attack. Commanders must be prepared to confront the full spectrum of physical threats and provide for the protection of personnel and installation resources. These evaluations and exercises are designed to capture the complete incident response cycle, from planning to response, ability to maintain mission capability, and recovery. Evaluations/exercises will consist of the following elements: evaluation planning and scenarios, exercise evaluation, and major rated areas.

A9.2. Evaluation Planning and Scenarios

A9.2.1. Planning. The IG will conduct FSTR exercises during Nuclear Surety, Unit Compliance, Operational Readiness inspections in accordance with existing guidelines as well as other exercises as directed by COMUSAFE. These exercises may be planned and conducted by the IG or the IG may task unit EETs to plan and conduct FSTR exercises. When tasked, the EET will submit four FSTR scenarios: one for Terrorist use of WMD, one for natural disaster, one for major accident and one for enemy attack.

A9.2.2. Local Exercise Planning. Unit EETs will use this instruction to plan, develop, run and evaluate local unit exercises.

A9.2.3. Scenario Library. Unit EETs are encouraged to maintain a scenario library for use in fulfilling quarterly exercise requirements. Scenarios should not be used more than once every three years except to re-evaluate deficient areas.

A9.2.4. Scenarios. All scenarios will be developed to provide a realistic multi-agency combined response. Scenarios will be developed to meet quarterly exercise requirements found in AFI 10-2501, *Full Spectrum Threat Response (FSTR) Planning and Operations* and the USAFE Supplement to AF 10-2501. Scenarios will be developed using the following format:

A9.2.4.1. Cover Sheet. Will contain unit information and release of information statement, i.e., "This document is close hold for IG/EET use only".

A9.2.4.2. Chapter 1. General Information. Will contain exercise date, time, location and a summary of the exercise scenario.

A9.2.4.3. Chapter 2. Team Composition. Will contain list of evaluators, subject matter experts, location during evaluation and method of communication, i.e., radio call sign and/or phone number.

A9.2.4.4. Chapter 3. Authors Guide. Will contain a list of all areas to be rated during the exercise. The evaluator responsible for each rated area will also be listed. A short paragraph concerning the objective for each rated area may be included if not contained in this or other guidance.

A9.2.4.5. Chapter 4. Sequence of Events. Will contain a sequential timeline of each planned event. Timeline will include approximate time of event from start 00:00hrs. It will describe the event and/or quote an exercise input if required. The timeline will also list the expected outcome(s) based on the event.

A9.2.4.6. Chapter 5. Safety and Rules of Engagement. Will list possible safety hazards that may effect the participants of the exercise. List exercise stop procedures and corrective action procedures used to prevent

unsafe actions. List appropriate rules of engagement from AFI 10-2501 as well as any local simulations and deviations.

A9.2.4.7. Chapter 6. Supporting Information. May contain any information used to explain and/or clarify the scenario.

A9.3. Exercise Evaluation

A9.3.1. Inspection Phases. Use the response phases described in AFMAN 32-4004, Emergency Response Operations.

A9.3.2. FSTR initiation: HQ USAFE/IG and unit EET-driven evaluations/exercises will be initiated by verbal or written exercise inputs. The initiation input, no matter what communication method is used, will start with "This is a Headquarters USAFE/IG exercise" or "This is a Wing EET exercise." as appropriate.

A9.3.3. All telephone and radio communications will be proceeded by a phrase clearly identifying the communication as an exercise (i.e., "Exercise Message", "Exercise, Exercise, Exercise").

A9.3.4. Fax/E-Mail messages will start with the phrase, "This is a Headquarters USAFE/IG exercise message." or "This is a Wing EET exercise message." as appropriate.

A9.3.5. The IG and or unit EET will not confront unit members with situations that could be interpreted as actual hostile action. Under no circumstances, will any IG or unit EET evaluators attempt to compromise security plans or gain unauthorized access to the exercise area.

A9.3.6. Exercises will not compromise safety. Actual emergencies take immediate precedence over evaluations/exercises.

A9.3.7. Higher Headquarters (HHQ). During HQ USAFE/IG-driven FSTR evaluations/exercises the IG Team functions as HHQ for all exercise-associated events. Any questions directed to HHQ should be presented to the IG Team Chief or designated representative, in the format specified by the IG. Units should expect response to such messages in a time frame commensurate with the scenario.

A9.4. Safety.

A9.4.1. Responsibilities. The IG/EET Team Chief or unit commander may declare recesses for unforeseen circumstances such as weather or other uncontrollable factors that adversely affect safe operations.

A9.4.2. Safety Violation. HQ USAFE/IG and or unit EET evaluators will assess safety throughout the inspection. Violation of safety standards could impact ratings in those areas in which a potential safety violation is observed. Impact on ratings depends on the severity of the violation.

A9.5. FSTR Termination. The IG/EET Team Chief will declare "ENDEX" when all major rated areas have been observed sufficiently.

A9.6. Communications with the IG Team. Prepare all messages and communications required by the evaluation/exercise scenario. All required voice communication will be made. Maintain a copy of messages for IG review. Provide exercise records and logs as specified by the IG. Unit EETs will develop unit-specific procedures to handle communication with the EET.

A9.7. Simulations and Deviations. Approved simulations and deviations (**Attachment 11 (Added)**) do not relieve the unit from all responsibilities with regard to a specific item. Unit members must notify the inspector upon implementing an approved simulation or deviation. Unless told otherwise by the IG/EET, resources (manpower and equipment) must be dedicated for the duration of the simulated task. If individuals or equipment are assigned to a task that is to be simulated, the individuals or equipment will not be

available for another task until the simulated task time has expired. ***NOTE:*** There are no standing or pre-approved simulations or deviations for USAFE EURO-THUNDER Exercises.

A9.7.1. Security and Custody: Critical C2 and local/remote monitoring facilities will not be evacuated for exercises.

A9.7.2. Communications: Evacuation and destruction of COMSEC, classified, and TPC materials will not be accomplished. Capability of destruction must be demonstrated.

A9.7.3. Command and Control: Telephone lines will not be disrupted.

A9.7.4. Mission-essential personnel will not evacuate the Command Post, Munitions Control, Communications Center, Central Security Control, Police Services Desk, and medical aid facilities.

A9.8. EURO THUNDER Deliverables.

A9.8.1. The following items will be provided to the IG upon arrival and execution of an EURO THUNDER Inspection:

A9.8.1.1. A private room (Team Center).

A9.8.1.2. Key personnel list with phone numbers.

A9.8.1.3. The following is required by the IG team within two hours of arrival:

A9.8.1.3.1. NIPRNET access in the IG Team Center

A9.8.1.3.2. At least one computer with access to a color printer, with paper, located in the IG Team Center

A9.9. Evaluation Ratings. Inspectors will use the five-tier rating system as outlined in AFI 90-201 to evaluate all major areas. Inspectors will assign overall ratings to the highest level of organization being inspected based on performance and will use objective rating criteria whenever possible. However, these criteria are designed as a guide and not as a substitute for good judgment.

A9.10. FSTR Evaluation/Exercise.

A9.10.1. The IG and or unit EET will normally evaluate only those specific areas required for exercise accomplishment. The following is a list of the rated areas normally evaluated (Other tasked units and teams may be evaluated as driven by the scenario):

A9.10.1.1. Emergency and Contingency Response Plans: The IG/EET will evaluate installation plans dealing with FSTR incidents and responses and other plans related to emergency response as applicable.

A9.10.1.2. Command and Control: The IG/EET will evaluate installation command and control. This includes initial and follow-up notification, flow of information from key personnel to the on-scene commander and flow and reporting of information from the on-scene commander to Wing leadership as required.

A9.10.1.2.1. Unit Leadership: The IG/EET will evaluate leadership's ability to support emergency activities while ensuring maximum mission readiness.

A9.10.1.2.2. Command Post: The IG/EET will evaluate the installation's ability to recall appropriate personnel and communicate pertinent information to affected on- and off-base personnel, communities, and organizations in a timely manner. The installation's ability to execute required reporting (i.e. Security Incident and OPREP reports) will also be evaluated.

A9.10.1.2.3. Base Response: The IG/EET will evaluate the base populace's response to the exercise scenario. This includes; notification procedures, use of self-aid/buddy-care, implementation of Battle Staff Directives and response to command instructions.

A9.10.1.3. Disaster Control Group (DCG) Function: The IG/EET will evaluate the ability of the DCG to provide on-scene command and control, DCG control of military resources and DCG functional expertise. Only functions needed to mitigate the exercise scenario will normally be evaluated.

A9.10.1.4. Unit Control Centers (UCC): The IG/EET will evaluate essential UCCs required for the successful mitigation of the emergency. The IG/EET will evaluate checklists, disaster response maps, communications equipment, alternate control centers and recall rosters. The IG/EET will evaluate required logs to ensure completeness and accuracy. UCCs that may be evaluated include but are not limited to: Fire Alarm Communication Center and Central Security Control.

A9.10.1.5. Emergency Response Forces: The IG/EET will evaluate appropriate response of emergency forces as required to mitigate the emergency.

A9.10.1.5.1. Security Forces: The IG/EET will evaluate the wing's implementation of the Base Antiterrorism and Force Protection Plan as well as the Installation Security Plan. Emphasis will be placed on the installation's ability to implement and execute security operations, protect personnel and resources and respond to a terrorist attack involving a WMD, natural disaster, major accident or enemy attack.

A9.10.1.5.2. Fire and Emergency Services: The IG/EET will evaluate all fire protection activities required to conduct rescue, save lives and protect property. The IG/EET will evaluate incident management, safety, emergency medicine, fire suppression, hazardous materials mitigation, decontamination, technical rescue, accountability and other emergency activities as required.

A9.10.1.5.3. Medical Response: The IG/EET will evaluate the unit's ability to properly respond, treat, report and transport casualties as well as their ability to monitor and provide recommendations for environmental control during the exercise. Evaluation will be based on the unit's Medical Contingency Response Plan (MCRP). The IG/EET will evaluate the senior medical member's ability to manage casualty flow. Bioenvironmental engineering will be evaluated on their health risk assessment; this may include identification of unknown potentially hazardous materials, recommendations for protective measures and equipment, and assessment of potential exposure and health impact.

A9.10.1.5.4. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD): The IG/EET will evaluate the unit's ability to properly respond to, render safe, dispose of, neutralize and mitigate an EOD incident. Additionally, personal actions to ensure individual survivability will be evaluated during all phases of the evaluation/exercise.

A9.10.1.6. Support and Recovery Teams: The IG/EET will evaluate any teams formed from base personnel supporting emergency response actions. The IG/EET will also evaluate any equipment and or resources planned for use by any specialized team during a FSTR exercise.

A9.11. Report Format.

A9.11.1. The IG and unit EETs will use the standard HQ USAFE/IG Inspection Report format as described in this section.

A9.11.1.1. A cover page will be used. Cover page will include, as a minimum, the inspecting organization, the inspected unit organization, dates of the inspection and the following statement:

"THIS IS A PRIVILEGED DOCUMENT THAT CANNOT BE RELEASED IN WHOLE OR PART TO PERSONS OR AGENCIES OUTSIDE THE AIR FORCE, NOR CAN IT BE REPUBLISHED IN

WHOLE OR PART IN ANY PUBLICATION NOT CONTAINING THIS STATEMENT, INCLUDING AIR FORCE MAGAZINES AND GENERAL USE PAMPHLETS, WITHOUT THE EXPRESS APPROVAL OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE."

A9.11.1.2. An "EXECUTIVE SUMMARY" will be used to summarize inspection results. As a minimum, a list of rated areas and the grades provided will be included in the summary.

A9.11.1.3. The report will contain the exercise "Concept of Operations," "Scenario" and "Rating Descriptions and Guidelines".

A9.11.1.4. The report will include all rated areas and will list "Strengths," "Findings," and "Recommended Improvement Areas" as described in AFI 90-201.

A9.11.1.5. The report will be signed by the IG/EET Team Chief as a minimum.

Attachment 10 (Added)

FUNCTIONAL INSPECTIONS GUIDES (FIG)

A10.1. Inspection Guide Policy:

A10.1.1. Guides are for command-wide use. They will include, but are not limited to, items reflecting requirements mandated by law, Executive Order, DoD directive and safety. Guides should address and assess the unit's efficiency, effectiveness, combat readiness, and should include those items deemed appropriate by the USAFE staff directorates. USAFE Staff offices of primary responsibility (OPR) should also ensure ORI guides include Common Core Readiness Criteria and UCI guides include Common Core Compliance Area Application as defined in the basic of this supplement.

A10.1.2. Guides are applicable to units at all organizational levels as identified by the inspection applicability code.

A10.1.3. Guide items or questions may require demonstration or proof of accomplishment.

A10.1.4. Guide items or questions do not constitute the order nor limit the scope of the inspection. However, they indicate the HQ USAFE functional directorate's relative importance of each task. Inspectors may look at any area that affects mission accomplishment, safety, security, and reliability, or is in direct conflict with higher headquarters guidance.

A10.2. Guide Preparation:

A10.2.1. USAFE staff directorates will publish UCI and ORI FIGs through command publishing using the format described in this Attachment, reference AFI 33-360 Volume 1, *Air Force Content Management Program - Publications*. Update FIGs at least annually and within 90 days of publication of a new policy or instruction. Refer to the USAFE Publications Management web site for additional specific administrative details.

Table A10.1. Mandatory coordination for guides includes:

HQ USAFE/JA	USAFE Staff Judge Advocate
HQ USAFE/PA	Public Affairs
USAFE CSS/SCBS	Records Management
	Administrative Communication
USAFE CSS/SCXI	Privacy Act/FOIA
	Publications and IMT/Forms Management
HQ USAFE/IGI	Inspector General Inspection Flight

A10.2.1.1. Submit draft, all coordination, electronic copy, and AF Form 673, **Request to Issue Publication**, signed by 3-letter as certifier and 2-letter as approving authority to USAFE CSS/SCXI for publishing. The Publishing Section (USAFE CSS/SCXI) assigns the appropriate control number and processes the guide as a standard publication.

A10.3. UCI FIGs. Identify items or questions as Core Compliance Guide Items (CCGI) or Compliance Guide Items (CGI). This is designed to allow managers at all levels to prioritize command requirements and to allow the HQ USAFE/IG inspectors to assess criticality of deficiencies.

A10.3.1. CCGI. Items identified by HQ USAFE directorates as key result areas for successful mission accomplishment including, but not limited to, items where noncompliance could result in serious injury, loss of life, excessive cost, litigation, or effect system reliability. These requirements may be mandated by law, Executive Order, DoD directive, safety or Air Force and USAFE strategic plans. CCGIs are referred to as significant guide items requiring direct IG evaluation. Identify CCGIs in guides by using uppercase, bold letters.

A10.3.2. CGI. The areas that require special vigilance and are important to the overall performance of the unit are CGI. Noncompliance could result in some negative impact on mission performance but is not likely to result in injury, unnecessary cost, or possible litigation. Identify CGIs in guides by using standard sentence case.

A10.3.3. ORI FIGs identify items or questions as Common Core Readiness Criteria (CCRC) or Readiness Criteria (RC). This is designed to allow managers at all levels to prioritize command requirements and ensure mandated items are evaluated.

A10.3.3.1. Common Core Readiness Criteria (CCRC). CCRC represent five basic, overarching readiness criteria mandated by the USAF Inspector General. The USAFE/IG ensures CCRC is applied to each area of their respective ORI. Each CCRC has one or more associated questions to facilitate its use by inspectors. Identify CCRCs by using uppercase, bold letters.

A10.3.3.1.1. Threat. Is the unit able to implement and sustain appropriate measures to meet changing force protection conditions?

A10.3.3.1.2. Safety. Does the unit safety program facilitate unit readiness?

A10.3.3.1.3. Security. Were adequate measures employed throughout the exercise? Were operations security (OPSEC) procedures incorporated into plans and followed throughout the exercise? Were proper communications security (COMSEC) materials available, as specified in tasked operations plans, to ensure mission accomplishment? Were COMSEC, computer security (COMPUSEC), and other measures employed to deny the enemy information?

A10.3.3.1.4. Communications and Information. Were these operations effective?

A10.3.3.1.5. Training. Were units properly trained and equipped to perform wartime duties?

A10.3.3.2. Readiness Criteria (RC). Areas deemed necessary by functional managers that require special vigilance and are important to the overall performance of the unit. Noncompliance could result in some negative impact on mission performance. Identify RCs using standard sentence case.

A10.3.4. References for each item or question to include the appropriate directive and paragraph in the FIG.

A10.3.5. The use of a Yes/No column for guides is optional.

A10.3.6. Guides will be numbered within the functional series according to AFI 33-360, Volume 1, for example if the guide deals mostly with an aircraft maintenance function or organization, the short title would be USAFE CL 21-X. The control numbers will be assigned by HQ USAFE Publishing (USAFE CSS/SCXI) during the coordination process.

A10.3.7. Inspection Applicability Code (IAC). Implementation guide OPRs will assign an IAC pertaining to the unit the guide question applies. Codes are as follows:

Table A10.2. Inspection Applicability Table.

IAC	UNIT
1	HQ USAFE
2	NAF
3	MOB
4	ASOG
5	MUNSS
6	MUNS
7	ABS/ABG/CSW
8	Communications Sites
9	USAFE Postal Activities
10	USAFE Joint Support Squadron and associated detachments
11	Other (state reason in applicability column)

Figure A10.1. Sample UCI Guide Format.

USAFECL14-1

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER UNITED STATES AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

UNITED STATES AIR FORCES IN EUROPE CHECKLIST 14-1

15 NOVEMBER 2002

Intelligence

UNIT COMPLIANCE INSPECTION CHECKLIST--INTELLIGENCE UNITS GUIDE

OPR: HQ USAFE (Maj Derek V. Hill)

Certified by: HQ USAFE/IN (Col Smaul A. Smith)

Pages 9/Distribution: F

This publication implements Air Force Policy directive (AFPD) 14-1, *Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Planning, Resources, and Operations*. This Functional Inspection Guide (FIG) is developed to support AFI 90-201, *Inspector General Activities*, and AFI 90-201 USAFE Supplement 1, inspection programs. This guide identifies compliance items that support guidance in the following: law, executive order, higher headquarters publication (DoD, JCS, FAA, AFI, AFMAN, AFTO, etc.) and United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) publications. It applies to all USAFE Intelligence units and members as indicated in paragraph 2. This guide supports guidance in AFI 14-105, Unit Intelligence Mission and Responsibilities, as well as the associated USAFE supplement. This guide applies to active duty USAFE units and those reserve forces assigned to USAFE. This guide is intended for inspection use. Send comments and suggested improvements to this publication on AF Form 847, **Recommendations for Change of Publication**, to USAFE Intelligence Directorate, HQ USAFE/INRS, Unit 3050 Box 80, APO AE 09094.

1. General. The items listed do not constitute the order or limit the scope of the inspection or assessment. As a minimum, units should use FIGs in conjunction with the Unit Self-Assessment. The objective is to identify deficiencies that preclude attainment of required capabilities. Higher headquarters may use this guide in whole or in part during visits or exercises.

1.1. Core Compliance Guide Items (CCGI) and Compliance Guide Items (CGI). Items identified by functional managers to prioritize command requirements and to allow the USAFE/IG inspectors to assess criticality of deficiencies.

1.1.1. CCGI. Items identified by HQ USAFE directorates and functional managers as key result areas for successful mission accomplishment including, but not limited to, items where non-compliance could result in serious injury, loss of life, excessive cost, litigation or affect system reliability. These requirements may be mandated by law, Executive Order, DoD directive, safety or Air Force and USAFE strategic plans. CCGIs are referred to as significant guide items requiring direct IG evaluation. Identify CCGIs by using uppercase and bold letters.

1.1.2. CGI. CGI are areas that require special vigilance and are important to the overall performance of the unit. Noncompliance could result in some negative impact on mission performance but is not likely to result in injury, unnecessary cost, or litigation. Identify CGIs by using standard sentence case.

2. Applicability. All items on this guide are assigned an applicability code designating the wing/unit/installation to which the item applies.

Table 1. Inspection Items for Intelligence Units.

Item Number	Item	Reference	Applicability Code	Yes/No
1.	General			
1.1.	**HAS THE WING/GROUP SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICER (SIO) DEVELOPED, IMPLEMENTED AND EXECUTED A FORCE PROTECTION SUPPORT PROGAM AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE WING/BASE INSTALLATION COMMANDER'S FORCE PROTECTION PROGRAM?**	AFI 14-105, paragraph 1.1.2.9	3,4,7	
1.2.	**HAS THE WING/GROUP SIO APPOINTED, IN WRITING, AN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER/NCO AND ESTABLISHED FORMAL PROCEDURES FOR COORDINATING ANTI-TERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION INTELLIGENCE WITH THE LOCAL OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS, SECURITY FORCES AND SPECIAL SECURITY OFFICE AS APPROPRIATE?**	AFI 14-105, paragraph 1.1.2.9.1	3,4,7	
1.3.	Is the unit anti-terrorism/force protection POC a member of the wing/group force protection working group?	AFI 14-105, paragraph 1.1.2.9.2	3,4,7	
1.4.	Does the wing/group SIO monitor peacetime flying and squadron personnel schedules to ensure required intelligence support is available?	AFI 14-105, paragraph 1.1.2.12.1	3,7	
1.5.	Has the wing/group SIO appointed, in writing, a primary and alternate Intelligence Reference Materials Manager (IRMM) according to MAJCOM requirements to manage unit statements, intelligence document requirements, intelligence reference materials and unit library?	AFI 14-105, paragraph 1.1.2.13	3,4,7	

Item Number	Item	Reference	Applicability Code	Yes/No
1.6.	Does the wing/group SIO determine intelligence document requirements (to include mobility documents and references) for the wing/group and squadrons based on mission requirements, unit operations, OPLANs, air expeditionary force, contingency, emergency war order and past ad hoc tasking as applicable? (Wing/group SIOs with geographically separated units [GSUs] will monitor GSU requirements to ensure documents are on hand.)	AFI 14-105, paragraph 1.1.2.13.1	3,4,7	
1.7.	Does the wing/group SIO input and maintain statements of intelligence interest (SII) for the wing/group into the Joint Dissemination System (JDS) for MAJCOM validation?	AFI 14-105, paragraph 1.1.2.13.2	3,4,7	
1.8.	Does the wing/group SIO periodically publish and disseminate an accession list to squadrons incorporating all new incoming intelligence reference materials?	AFI 14-105, paragraph 1.1.2.13.4	3,4,7	
1.9.	Does the wing/group SIO manage the wing/ group production requirement (PR) program IAW Department of Defense Intelligence Production Program (DoDIIP) and MAJCOM/ theater guidance, as appropriate?	AFI 14-105, paragraph 1.1.2.14	3,4,7	

SMAUL A. SMITH, Colonel, USAF

Director of Intelligence

Figure A10.2. Sample ORI Guide Format.

USAFECL14-2

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

UNITED STATES AIR FORCES IN EUROPE CHECKLIST 14-2

15 NOVEMBER 2001

Intelligence

PHASE I OPERATIONAL READINESS INSPECTION GUIDE FOR INTELLIGENCE UNITS

OPR: HQ USAFE/INRS (Maj Derek V. Hill)

Certified by: HQ USAFE/IN (Col Smaul A. Smith)

Pages: 05/Distribution: F

This publication implements Air Force Policy directive (AFPD) 14-1, *Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Planning, Resources, and Operations*. This Functional Inspection guide (FIG) is developed to support AFI 90-201, *Inspector General Activities*, and AFI 90-201 USAFE Supplement 1, inspection programs. This guide identifies items that evaluate the ability of a unit with a wartime or contingency mission to perform assigned operational missions (e.g. designed operational capability (DOC) and, or mission essential task list (METL) associated taskings and assigned operations plan (OPLAN) taskings). It applies to all United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) Intelligence units and members as indicated in para 2. This guide supports guidance in AFI 14-105, Unit Intelligence Mission and Responsibilities, as well as the associated USAFE supplement. This guide applies to active duty USAFE units and those reserve forces assigned to USAFE. This guide is intended for inspection use. Send comments and suggested improvements to this publication on AF Form 847, **Recommendations for Change of Publication**, to USAFE Intelligence Directorate, HQ USAFE/INRS, Unit 3050 Box 80, APO AE 09094.

1. General. The items listed do not constitute the order or limit the scope of the inspection or assessment. As a minimum, units should use FIGs in conjunction with the Unit Self-Assessment. The objective is to identify deficiencies that preclude attainment of required capabilities. Higher headquarters may use this guide in whole or in part during visits or exercises.

1.1. Common Core Readiness Criteria (CCRC). CCRC represent five basic, overarching readiness criteria that the USAFE/IG will apply to each area of its ORIs. Each CCRC has one or more associated questions to facilitate its use by inspectors. Upper case and bold letters are used to identify CCRCs. The five areas include.

1.1.1. Threat. Is the unit able to implement and sustain appropriate measures to meet changing force protection conditions?

1.1.2. Safety. Does the unit safety program facilitate unit readiness?

1.1.3. Security. Were adequate measures employed throughout the exercise? Were OPSEC procedures incorporated into plans and followed throughout the exercise? Were proper COMSEC materials available, as specified in tasked operations plans, to ensure mission accomplishment? Were COMSEC, COMPUSEC and other measures employed to deny the enemy information?

1.1.4. Communications and Information. Were these operations effective?

1.1.5. Training. Were units properly trained and equipped to perform wartime duties?

1.2. Readiness Criteria (RC). Areas deemed necessary by functional managers that require special vigilance and are important to the overall performance of the unit. Not adhering to RC could result in some negative impact on mission performance. Standard sentence case is used to identify RCs.

2. Applicability. All items on this guide are assigned an applicability code designating the wing/unit/ installation to which the item applies.

Table 1.

Item Number	Item	Reference	Applicability Code	Yes/No
1.	General:			
1.1.	Does the Wing/Group senior intelligence officer (SIO) analyze all incoming information for impact on the unit mission?	AFI 14-105, paragraph 1.1.2.8	3,4,7	
1.2.	**HAS THE WING' GROUP SIO DEVELOPED, IMPLEMENTED AND EXECUTED A FORCE PROTECTION SUPPORT PROGRAM AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE WING/ GROUP INSTALLATION COMMANDER'S FORCE PROTECTION PROGRAM?**	AFI 14-105 para 1.1.2.9	3,4,7	
1.3.	**ARE FORMAL PROCEDURES ESTABLISHED (AS NEEDED) AND FOLLOWED REGARDING COORDINATION OF ANTI-TERRORISM INTELLIGENCE WITH THE WING/BASE OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS AND SECURITY FORCES?**	AFI 14-105, paragraph 1.1.2.9.1	3,4,7	
1.4.	Is the unit anti-terrorism POC a member of the wing/group Force Protection Working Group?	AFI 14-105, paragraph 1.1.2.9.2	3,4,7	
1.5.	Are electronic and hard copy intelligence libraries organized to permit timely retrieval of all documents and material required to support contingency tasking?	AFI 14-105, paragraph 1.1.2.13.3	3,4,7	

Item Number	Item	Reference	Applicability Code	Yes/No
1.6.	**ARE REQUIREMENTS AND POLICIES CONTAINED IN AFI 16-201, DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, ADHERED TO FOR DISCLOSING CLASSIFIED AND CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION TO FOREIGN NATIONALS? ARE ALL CLASSIFIED AND CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY A PROPERLY DESIGNATED DISCLOSURE AUTHORITY BEFORE RELEASE?**	AFI 14-105, paragraph 1.1.2.16	3,4,7	
1.7.	Are all intelligence procedures and processes (briefings, situation displays, etc.) standardized throughout the wing/group to the fullest extent possible?	AFI 14-105, paragraph 1.1.2.21	3,4,7	
1.8.	Has the wing/group SIO developed quality control procedures to ensure standardization and accuracy of briefings and situation/ Order of Battle (OB) displays? Does the unit use Department of the Army FM 101-5-1, computer system and/or Chart-Pak symbology when developing OB symbology?	AFI 14-105, USAFE Supplement 1, paragraph 1.1.2.21 and 1.1.2.21.1	3,4,7	
1.9.	Do operational squadron intelligence personnel provide intelligence to the squadron during all phases of operations, to include, but not limited to, current intelligence, scenario inputs and mission planning?	AFI 14-105, paragraph 1.1.3.1	3,7	

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Director of Intelligence

Attachment 11 (Added)

SIMULATION AND DEVIATION POLICY

A11.1. Simulations and Deviations. Only HQ USAFE/IG approved simulations and deviations will be used. An issue could be a simulation and/or deviation. Additionally, requests for simulations and deviations will be submitted to the HQ USAFE/IGI according to the instructions below. Simulations and deviations will be reserved for those actions that are impossible or impractical to perform. There are no standing sims/devs for EURO FLASH/FSTR evaluations.

A11.1.1. Simulation examples include:

A11.1.1.1. Example 1. Using training crimpers vs. operational crimpers for aircraft loading operations. All acts are to be performed as if operational crimper were used.

A11.1.1.2. Example 2. The withdrawal requirement will be simulated by a withdrawal of 300 feet in lieu of 2000 feet. Basically, the act or procedure will be demonstrated by some other means.

A11.1.2. Deviation examples include:

A11.1.2.1. Example 1. Security will not be posted for static loading operations.

A11.1.2.2. Example 2. During exercise scenarios, if real-world emergencies require response, Chemical Biological Weapons Defense Ensemble will not be worn.

A11.2. Coordinating Simulations and Deviations. Coordinate all simulations and deviations not expressly authorized by this Attachment, exercise implementing instructions, inspection ground rules, or higher headquarters directive with the IG prior to accomplishment. Do not request a simulation or deviation for an item that is specifically covered and/or prohibited in higher headquarters guidance or technical publications.

A11.2.1. Approved simulations and deviations (standing or unit requested) do not relieve the unit from all responsibilities with regard to a specific item. Unit members must notify the inspector upon implementing an approved simulation or deviation. Unless told otherwise by the IG, resources (manpower and equipment) must be dedicated for the duration of the simulated task. If individuals or equipment are assigned to a task that is to be simulated, that individual or equipment will not be available for another task until the simulated task time has expired.

A11.3. IG Approval of Simulations and Deviations. HQ USAFE/IG will approve simulations and deviations only when it is impossible or impractical to perform actual procedures or to use specified equipment.

A11.4. Newly Issued Policy or Guidance. When an inspected unit is in receipt of newly issued policy or guidance, and it is impossible to implement the new policy or guidance, or would cause confusion and potentially disrupt the conduct of the inspection, the unit may submit a deviation request. The deviation request should explain how the unit is implementing, or plans to implement, the new policy.

A11.5. Standing Simulations. The following are general standing simulations and deviations approved by the HQ USAFE/IG:

A11.5.1. Movement of drugs and narcotics.

A11.5.2. Deployment of DD Form 2766, **Adult Preventive and Chronic Care Flowsheet**, AF Form 1480B, **Adult Preventive and Chronic Care Flowsheet Continuation Sheet**; most current physical (i.e.

SF 88, **Report of Medical Examination**); and AF Form 1042, **Medical Recommendation for Flying or Special Operational Duty**. ***NOTE:*** IG inspectors may elect to randomly select and inspect the DD Forms 2766/AF Forms 1480B of a chalk to evaluate suitability for deployment.

A11.5.3. Movement of patient's vehicles away from medical treatment facilities during FPCON changes.

A11.5.4. Use of real US and foreign currency and US Treasury Checks (provide simulated treasury checks totaling $100,000; simulated US cash totaling $100,000; and 400,000 simulated foreign units at exchange rate of four foreign to one US dollar).

A11.5.5. Authentication of special orders (provide minimum distribution to the appropriate workstations and make additional copies only as required by local policy).

A11.5.6. Recall of personnel from leave and TDY.

A11.5.7. Initiation of stop loss actions.

A11.5.8. Projection of TDY data into the personnel data system.

A11.5.9. Wear of chemical biological warfare defense ensemble (CBWDE) during response to actual in-flight emergencies or flight line mishaps.

A11.5.10. Actual use of M8 and M9 detection paper. Use masking tape to simulate M8 and M9 paper. Masking tape will be marked as "M8 PAPER" or "M9 PAPER" with date and time

A11.5.11. Possession of 100 percent serviceable training CBWDE

A11.5.12. Possession and use of actual M291 skin and M295 equipment decontamination kits and M256A1 chemical agent detector kits in the field.

A11.5.13. Deployment of real world C-bags. C-bags will be issued to personnel and will be inspected and returned to storage. Training ground crew ensemble (GCE), mask, hood and filters will be deployed.

A11.5.14. Placement of the contamination control area based on site selection requirements in accordance with AFMAN 32-4005, *Personnel Protection and Attack Actions.*

A11.5.15. Replacement of canisters and filters for CBWDE protective masks.

A11.5.16. Dispersed vehicles, equipment, and personnel protective bunkers will be shown using rows of sandbags stacked one high and one wide.

A11.5.17. Facilities and tents will be considered as splinter-protected to a height of four feet and do not require sandbagging.

A11.5.18. Tone down of safety signs, safety markings (e.g. red or orange ribbons) on aerospace ground equipment (AGE) and fuel areas, radio antennas, and wave guide wires.

A11.5.19. Deployment of actual ammunition, other than that needed for real-world security. Once mobility munitions have been marshaled and inspected by IG personnel, they may be returned to the munitions storage area for proper storage.

A11.5.20. Turning off environmental control units (ECU) following chemical attacks.

A11.5.21. Movement of dumpsters away from buildings. A comprehensive plan must be available to illustrate how this would be accomplished.

A11.5.22. EOD Mobility munitions will not be dispersed.

A11.5.23. Constructing Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) protective works; however, the unit will be required to construct two protective works of actual proportions around two UXOs. One UXO equal-to or less-than 155mm in diameter, and one UXO greater-than 155mm in diameter. Other protective works may be simulated with a single sandbag placed at each corner. The number of people, sandbags, and time of construction must be given to the EOD inspector for each simulated protective work.

A11.5.24. To maintain real-world fire fighting capability, the number of firefighting personnel required to marshal through the Mobility Processing Line is limited to 16. The remainder of the firefighter UTC records will be processed. In addition, at no time will fire fighter personal protective equipment (PPE) be palletized. Firefighter PPE will be placed on a pallet and weighed. The PPE will be removed from the pallet and returned to the respective firefighting vehicles and the pallet will be tracked for processing and shipment as would normally occur.

A11.5.25. The discharge of fire extinguishing agents during these exercises shall be at the discretion of the fire protection inspector. The fire department will be required to show firefighting capability, to include the discharge of water (and aqueous film forming foam if an authorized training pit is available), during the Structural Fire Exercise, Aircrew Egress Extraction Exercise, and Aircraft Crash Rescue Live Fire Exercise.

A11.5.26. Fire departments will demonstrate palletizing, weighing, and tracking of the appropriate number of individual mobility self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) for the deploying UTC. At no time will SCBAs be netted; however, the pallet must be weighed, accounted for, and tracked as if it were deploying to demonstrate capabilities; then, SCBAs may be returned to the fire station for real-world mission requirements.

A11.5.27. Removal of catalytic converters from deploying vehicles.

A11.5.28. Removal of reflective tape on deployment equipment.

A11.5.29. Host nation non-player may be used as bus driver to transport personnel to and from cantonment area.

A11.5.30. Non-UTC wrecker and host nation non-player mechanics may remove disabled vehicles from a roadway in the interest of safety. UTC personnel and vehicles will be used to repair or tow disabled vehicles to the deployed location.

A11.5.31. Due to environmental concerns, personnel will not be required to perform a fuel contamination check on tactical vehicles prior to convoy. Convoy personnel will be knowledgeable of fuel contamination check procedures and will be required to explain the procedure to inspectors.

A11.5.32. Block and brace every third chalk for surface movements.

A11.5.33. Only one copy of the cargo manifest in the aircraft commander's package.

A11.5.34. Disassembly, packing, and re-assembly of copiers.

A11.5.35. Destruction of classified products during relocations.

A11.5.36. Destruction of simulated contaminated food after attacks. See Prime Readiness in Base Support (RIBS) Amplifying Rules of Engagement (ROE) for details.

A11.5.37. Field feeding platform Safety NCO. See Prime RIBS Amplifying ROE for details.

A11.5.38. Refrigeration units for field mortuaries.

A11.5.39. Excavation of mass burial site.

A11.5.40. Sanitation of mortuary tent.

A11.5.41. Processing of simulated contaminated remains.

A11.5.42. CBWDE suits will not be worn when servicing LOX in an exercise or training environment due to the suit's ability to absorb gaseous oxygen and create an explosive condition. The entire CBWDE will be removed prior to start of LOX flow and will not be donned until lines are disconnected.

A11.6. Aviation Unit-Specific Simulations. The simulations listed below apply to aviation units only and are in addition to the general simulations listed above.

A11.6.1. Cannibalization of nonplayer aircraft to supplement Mobility Readiness Spares Package (MRSP) for PH I.

A11.6.2. Preparing and wrapping more than one serviceable spare engine of each type tasked for mobilization during PH I.

A11.6.3. Loading combat setting into electronic countermeasures (ECM) pods.

A11.6.4. Processing TS-4044D, AIM-7E, AIM-7F, AIM-7M, and AN/DSM-162A missile test sets for PH I.

A11.6.5. Movement of Bomber Strategic Aircraft Reconstitution Team (BSART) weapons, excluding small arms.

A11.6.6. US Air Force units will be asked for a Flush (actual vertical or lateral dispersal of aircraft) during threat of airfield attack.

A11.6.7. Wear of standard CWU-27/P flight suit to simulate the CWU-66/77P aircrew chemical coverall.

A11.6.8. Disposal of plastic overboots and overcapes.

A11.6.9. Wear of anti-exposure suit when not warranted by mission and climatic conditions.

A11.6.10. Issue of live ammunition. Aircrew Life Support (ALS) or other responsible agency will issue aircrews M9 (9mm) weapons without magazine clips. To demonstrate capability, IG inspectors may request a demonstration of loading and clearing procedures using live rounds. After the demonstration is complete, the live rounds and clips will be turned back into ALS or responsible agency. Under no circumstances will aircrew participating in the IG exercise depart the weapons issue area with a loaded ammunition magazine or depart the weapons issue area with an empty magazine inserted into the M9 weapon.

A11.6.11. Aircrew dress out procedures are as follows:

A11.6.11.1. Entering/Exiting the Play Area to the Squadron:

A11.6.11.1.1. Aircrews will wear standard ground crew training ensemble and individual protective equipment (IPE) over their flight suit commensurate, with the current MOPP level.

A11.6.11.2. In the Squadron/On the Flightline:

A11.6.11.2.1. Aircrews working in the exercise area, not on the flying schedule, will stay in the ground crew training ensemble consistent with the MOPP status.

A11.6.11.2.2. Aircrews on the flying schedule will use the following simulation for the aircrew chemical ensemble:

A11.6.11.2.2.1. MOPP 2. Wear standard nomex flight suit, nomex flight gloves, normal flying helmet with oxygen mask down/visor up, standard flight boots, other flight gear as required. Simulated M-9 tape is not worn on flight gear.

A11.6.11.2.2.2. MOPP 4. Wear normal flying mask up and put visor down/NVG bracket on. During chemical deposition phase, aircrew will wear the overcape and booties when outside the squadron building. The plastic overcape will not be worn during aircraft preflight/postflight inspections. The plastic overcape will not be worn after the chemical deposition phase.

A11.6.11.3. Aircrews scheduled to fly actual chemical warfare sorties will comply with the procedures specified in AFI 11-2MDS specific volumes and/or 32-series instructions.

A11.6.11.4. This simulation DOES NOT APPLY to aircrew scheduled to demonstrate ACCA decontamination procedures.

A11.6.12. Donning of protective mask, gloves, and field gear during elevated alarm conditions by personnel actively involved in uninstalled or installed engine run operations until engine run shut down procedures, per applicable technical order, are safely completed.

A11.6.13. Wear of protective mask, gloves, and field gear while performing End of Runway (EOR) duties.

A11.6.14. Wear of CBWDE by egress maintenance personnel during in-cockpit egress maintenance.

A11.6.15. Wear of CBWDE and field gear during aircraft engine inlet and exhaust inspections.

A11.6.16. Wear of protective mask while performing hot pit refueling operations.

A11.6.17. F-16 Halon Servicing. To comply with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) -mandated moratorium on Halon usage during peacetime operations and to demonstrate capability, units will perform all Halon servicing procedures except actually utilizing Halon or discharging nitrogen from purged bottles. This includes downloading and uploading aircraft, transporting bottles to and from the servicing area, and replenishing stock. Simulated usage of Halon will be based on expected wartime utilization rates. Bottles remain at the servicing stand for 15 minutes, but servicing hose or bottle hookup will not be performed to preclude Halon expenditure. Servicing equipment must be serviceable and set up for personnel to demonstrate proficiency. Personnel who would be utilized to operate servicing stand must be present during simulated servicing operations to preclude their use for other duties simultaneously. Any required consumable materials must also be available when appropriate.

A11.6.18. Wear of night vision goggles mount in lieu of CW flying mask for flights involving night operations.

A11.6.19. Supervisor of Flying (SOF) evacuation of control tower or SOF duty position.

A11.6.20. Evacuation of essential tower personnel.

A11.6.21. Use of LAU-131 rocket pods with less than seven operational tubes.

A11.6.22. Use of simulated escape and evasion (E&E) kits (same approximate size, weight, and type contents) in lieu of real world E&E kit.

A11.6.23. Empty munitions containers, in the same War Reserve Material (WRM) configuration, for delivery of components to the buildup site for downloading.

A11.6.24. Simulate removing nose art from deploying aircraft by blocking one half hour per aircraft to spray paint over nose art.

A11.6.25. Film/chemical containers, weighing the same as actual supplies, will be transported in lieu of actual supplies if the weather is too hot or cold. All chemical hazard restrictions will be followed.

A11.7. Munitions-Specific Simulations:

A11.7.1. The unit will determine local procedures to identify munitions as used or expended. Munitions breakout, buildup and delivery will be evaluated. The half-up, half-down concept will be employed. Each weapon will be assembled and loaded on trailers/aircraft and will be removed, disassembled, or packed into its container. The assembly, loading, downloading, and repacking will count as two weapons used.

A11.7.2. TGM-65, ATM-88, and AGM-88 Simulation Plugs. To demonstrate delivery, munitions trailers will be configured with empty AGM-65 containers or AGM-88 containers.

A11.7.3. Units required to transport munitions from off-base sites to on-base buildup areas or aircraft locations may load and unload components or built-up munitions at the off-base site and make the delivery and return with empty trailers and delivery vehicles.

A11.8. Simulation Request Format. Units will consolidate all simulations and deviations and submit as a single package. The package will be endorsed by the wing or unit commander on the last page of the document and have a signature block for the USAFE/IG Team Chief. Unit simulation/deviation requests will be submitted according to the following format:

Figure A11.1 Sample format for Unit Simulation/Deviation Requests.

Number: Unit-Group-Applicable Inspection Area (IR=Initial Response, EM=Employment, AT=ATSO, MS=Mission Support)-Last two digits of year and three-digit sequence number.

Type simulation: (Procedural or resource).

Requester: (XX WG/BW/FW/Office Symbol/Name/Phone Number).

UTCs: (if applicable).

Increment Numbers and line numbers: (if applicable).

WHAT? (Describe the simulated and deviated task or equipment).

HOW? (Describe how you will simulate and/or deviate from the task).

WHY? (Provide a brief explanation of why the simulation and deviation is required and the impact if the IG disapproves--resource expenditure, potential risk, etc).

EXAMPLE:

31FW-SG-IR-02001

Resource

31FW/CEX/SMS Pfeul/DSN XXX-XXXX

4F9E6, 4F9D2N/A

WHAT: Simulate the use of actual M-256 chemical detector kits during suspected chemical attacks.

HOW: NBC reconnaissance personnel will use training M-256 kits to perform detection tests.

WHY: Use of actual M-256 kits will cause a shortage of real-world UTC resources, and disposal of used kits generates hazardous waste.

A11.9. NSI and JSSI. These items do not need to be listed on the unit simulation and deviation request. However, if used, unit members need to be aware of proper procedures and requirements and be ready to explain them to evaluators.

A11.9.1. Weapons Maintenance Operations. Type 3E/A trainer used to simulate War Reserve (WR) asset. Trainer will be treated as WR. Differences between trainer and WR will be identified to inspector. This simulation applies during technical operations, aircraft loading, logistics movement, and contingency exercises when War Reserve (WR) assets are not available. The type of trainer will be concurrent with the operations being simulated on the trainer (i.e. general maintenance will be simulated using a Type 3A trainer, receipt verification/prep for shipment may be done using a Type 3E Mod 4, transport will be simulated using a Type 3E trainer). This simulation also applies to the use of training equipment used with the trainer being used (i.e. H1127).

A11.9.1.1. While simulating a WR asset, training items may have markings unlike that of a WR. All training markings will be considered acceptable after being brought to the attention of the inspector. Differences in markings must be explained to the inspector to ensure technicians are knowledgeable of WR markings.

A11.9.1.2. Requirement for Limited Life Component Exchange (LLCE) will be simulated as being due during month of inspection when using Type 3A. LLCE components will be reinstalled and considered

new (including Group X kit items). All reporting actions will be accomplished up to the point of transmission.

A11.9.1.3. Training H1616 container will be used to simulate actual container when WR maintenance is not due. Markings (including part numbers) unique to the training can will be identified to the inspector, simulated as their WR counterparts and accepted for use. Applicable external labels will be identified, but not applied.

A11.9.1.4. Permissive Action Link (PAL) operations will be demonstrated on either the Type 3E trainer or Code Management System (CMS) field tester when WR maintenance is not due. Request for actual Field Operations File (FOF) will be simulated. Differences between training and WR operations will be brought to the attention of the inspector.

A11.9.1.4.1. When simulating WR operations, technicians may document actions on a training Inspection Record Card (IRC) instead of the type 3 trainer IRC to prevent excessive marking on the type 3 trainer IRC. Technicians will have actual trainer IRCs available, but may accomplish documentation for the operation on training IRC. The training IRC must have all entries applicable to the operations being performed. Technicians may consult the actual IRC for discrepancies discovered, and if THE PROPER AUTHORITY HAS ACCEPTED THOSE DISCREPANCIES FOR USE DURING TRAINING, they may continue operations. Any item that needs to be documented on the actual trainer IRC will be documented during the inspection.

A11.9.1.5. During exercises and simulation operations, the Special Weapons Inventory Management (SWIM) or DIAMONDS database will use pre-determined numbers to simulate assets and reduce confusion. Prior to the inspection (via telecon or during inbrief), serial, part, mod, and alteration numbers will be agreed upon between the Munitions Accountable Systems Officer (MASO) and the inspector. Simulated numbers for installed/removed components during technical operations will also be agreed upon. Additionally, two separate training data bases will be built; one for emergency evacuation and one for command disablement. These numbers will BE ADDED to the SWIM training database, and will be used for the entire inspection.

A11.9.1.6. During technical operations, prior-to-use inspections may be performed before the inspector arrives to expedite the inspection process. This deviation applies to specific technical operations only after consulting with the inspector. Technicians must be able to show procedures and steps accomplished when performing the prior-to-use inspection. Additionally, inspectors may request a sample demonstration of some prior-to-use inspections to ensure proficiency.

A11.9.1.7. During contingency exercises, Universal Release Codes (URCs) will not be accessed to reduce exposure. Technicians must be capable of going to URC storage locations and describing removal. URC teams will simulate the removal and talk-through of procedures following removal.

A11.9.2. Aircraft Loading Activities:

A11.9.2.1. During static aircraft weapons loading, standard load procedures will be demonstrated and training munitions will be treated as WR. Security posting, shelter purge, vault operation, weapons maintenance actions and final denial will be simulated. If required to use the load training facility it will be treated as an approved loading site with designated no-lone-zone roped off to control access.

A11.9.2.2. During static loads in the Weapons Load Training (WLT) facility the aircraft canopy will not be closed at the end of the weapons load, to prevent unnecessary wear and tear on the aircraft canopy.

A11.9.2.3. Training crimpers will be used in lieu of operational crimpers for static loads in the WLT facility. Operational crimpers will be used for aircraft generation exercises.

A11.9.2.4. Inert cartridges may be used in the load training facility. Treat as real.

A11.9.2.5. Training aircraft forms will be used to document loading operations in the WLT facility. The actual aircraft forms will be available and used to verify the condition of the aircraft, but no training entries will be made in them.

A11.9.2.6. For WLT operations, certain aircraft systems or items may not be Fully Mission Capable (FMC). Loading and mating can be effectively demonstrated without an FMC aircraft. The weapons system will be fully functional (both mechanically and electrically). The aircraft will be configured to resemble a combat configuration i.e., 3X tanks and inert self defense munitions. Aircraft discrepancies will be brought to evaluator's attention.

A11.9.3. Evacuation and destruction of COMSEC, classified, and TPC materials will not be accomplished. Demonstration and capability must be shown.

A11.9.4. EXERCISES

A11.9.4.1. Reduction of evacuation distances/locations and cordon distances for contingency exercises. During contingency exercises, personnel will evacuate and place a cordon at least 300 feet instead of required distances. Additionally, some mission locations will not be evacuated during exercises. Capability of evacuation is fully evaluated using at least 300 feet versus required distances, to reduce the impact on real world missions. All personnel evacuating and providing cordon support must be able to describe actual withdrawal/evacuation distances and locations pertaining to the task or operation involved. The following facilities are exempt from evacuation of personnel essential to the operations of facilities:

A11.9.4.1.1. Local Monitoring Facility.

A11.9.4.1.2. Remote Monitoring Facility.

A11.9.4.1.3. Central Security Control.

A11.9.4.1.4. Alternate Central Security Control.

A11.9.4.1.5. Security Forces Armory.

A11.9.4.1.6. Installation and Restricted Area Entry points when posted.

A11.9.4.1.7. Command Post Emergency Action Cell.

A11.9.4.1.8. Munitions Control.

A11.9.4.1.9. Maintenance Operations Center.

A11.9.4.1.10. Units must provide a list of additional buildings that will not be evacuated during exercises to the inspector before the inspection or during the in-brief for approval. Individuals not evacuated because of this simulation will demonstrate knowledge of required evacuation actions.

A11.9.4.2. Unit will not stop or impede taxiing aircraft while establishing cordons or containment. Personnel will not endanger life or increase the likelihood of damage to equipment. This simulation applies to contingency exercises. Personnel must be knowledgeable of procedures for stopping aircraft and establishing cordons. All steps short of interfering with aircraft flow will be taken, and other steps will be talked-through.

A11.9.4.3. During exercises, Security Forces will not employ violent measures to meet objectives. Additionally, live explosives will not be used during denial scenarios, to prevent unnecessary risks and damage to equipment. This simulation applies to use of violent measures. Personnel must explain procedures for employment of measures and must be fully trained to accomplish the tasks.

A11.9.4.4. Fire extinguishers will not be operated during contingency exercises to prevent waste and damage. Technicians must be able to talk-through operation of fire extinguishers.

A11.9.4.5. Units will use training gear during contingencies. This simulation applies during contingency exercises where radiological gear must be worn. Technicians will wear training gear to show capability, and must explain all differences between training and actual gear.

A11.9.4.6. Use of Liquid Safeing Fluid (LSF). WILL NOT BE USED ON EOD TRAINING ASSETS. This simulation applies to EOD teams during simulated operations. When required, EOD teams will use water to simulate LSF. All differences must be explained to the inspector.

A11.9.4.7. EOD technicians will use trash bags for packaging instead of the required 6-mm thick bags. Technicians must show all items are readily available, and be able to demonstrate packaging on some items when the inspector requests it.

A11.9.4.8. Leave ADM 300A alpha probe cover on, during monitoring operations to prevent possible damage to the alpha probe. Technicians must tell the inspector exactly when and how the probe cover would be removed and replaced.

A11.9.4.9. To prevent inspection time conflicts, EOD technicians may use their equipment bay for EOD technical operations. This simulation applies to EOD technical operations. Technicians must apply all applicable precautions, procedures, and requirements as if performing the operations inside a hardened aircraft shelter or maintenance bay. Technicians must also demonstrate when these items apply and add to all applicable briefings.

A11.10. LOGISTICS MOVEMENT. During logistics movements, a vehicle may be used to simulate an aircraft if no aircraft is available. Technicians must be able to talk-through aircraft procedures, and security forces must be able to demonstrate knowledge of aircraft contingency operations and security procedures. Security procedures will be demonstrated to the maximum extent using the simulated aircraft.

A11.11. AIRCRAFT GENERATION. During aircraft and weapons acceptance, mission-required conventional weapons/ECM Pods/fuel tanks may be simulated loaded. A/C must be FMC for A/C Generation & properly configured. Expect verbal evaluation(s) on any simulated load based on appropriate checklists.

A11.12. NSI and JSSI Simulation Request Format. Units will consolidate all simulations and deviations and submit as a single package. The package will be endorsed by the wing (including host nation) and, or MUNSS commander on the last page of the document and have a signature block for the USAFE/IG Team Chief. Units are encouraged to work closely with the IG project officer to ensure package is ready for signature prior to the unit in-brief. Unit simulation and deviation requests will be submitted according to the following format:

Figure A11.2. Sample Format for Unit Simulation and Deviation Request.

AREA: (Maintenance, Security, Command Post, Communications, Safety, etc)

WHAT? (Describe the simulated and deviated task or equipment.)

HOW? (Describe how you will simulate and/or deviate from the task.)

WHY? (Provide a brief explanation of why the simulation or deviation is required and the impact if the IG disapproves--resource expenditure, potential risk, etc.)

EXAMPLE:

AREA: Communications

WHAT: Removal of TPC and classified from the communication center will be simulated.

HOW: Unit will demonstrate removal by using inventory lists and containers of appropriate size to simulate removal.

WHY: Removal of TPC and classified items greatly increases the risk of compromise and loss of highly sensitive items.

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED by:_____(IG Inspector)_____

Inspector Comments:

Attachment 12 (Added)

MULTIMEDIA SUPPORT

A12.1. Multimedia Tasking.

A12.1.1. HQ USAFE/IG will task USAFE wings to provide multimedia support for inspection out-briefings.

A12.1.2. Once tasked, wing multimedia flights will provide digital photos on CD-ROM as specified by this Attachment. Videos will be requested by IG team chief by memorandum. Provide requested photos to IG team chief on day one of inspection.

A12.2. Photo Specifications:

A12.2.1. Images will be in the JPEG file format.

A12.2.2. Image size will be 1024 pixels (width) x 768 pixels (height) at 100 dpi minimum.

A12.2.3. Color depth will be full RGB 24 bit.

A12.2.4. The following standardized numbering system will be used to name all JPEG images:

A12.2.4.1. Wing Agencies: WA001.JPG through WA039.JPG.

A12.2.4.2. Group Pictures: GP001.JPG, GP002.JPG, etc.

A12.2.4.3. Individual squadrons: unit number and abbreviation for each: 52CS001.JPG, 606ACS001.JPG, etc.

A12.2.4.4. Motivational Pictures: MP001.JPG through MP120.JPG.

A12.2.4.5. Picture Groups 1 through 5: PG1001.JPG through PG5001.JPG.

A12.2.4.6. For multiple shots of the same number, use the following: AL400.JPG, AL400A.JPG, and AL400B.JPG, etc. Because the images are shot at a 2:3 ratio, but projected at a 3:4 ratio, leave room on each side of your photos to compensate for cropping (especially Group shots).

A12.3. Air Force Standards.

A12.3.1. Photos taken of personnel will be reviewed to ensure appearance meets Air Force standards. Personnel photos with violations of appearance standards will not be accepted.

A12.4. Required Organizational Photos.

A12.4.1. Wing Agencies

A12.4.1.1. Wing Shield graphic on black background.

A12.4.1.2. Wing Commander (official photo as well as in an office setting, not sitting behind a desk).

A12.4.1.3. Three group photos of the following agencies:

A12.4.1.3.1. Wing Staff

A12.4.1.3.2. Command Post staff

A12.4.1.3.3. Chapel staff

A12.4.1.3.4. Historian staff

A12.4.1.3.5. Inspector General and Exercise Evaluation Team

A12.4.1.3.6. Staff Judge Advocate

A12.4.1.3.7. Manpower staff

A12.4.1.3.8. MEO staff

A12.4.1.3.9. Public Affairs staff

A12.4.1.3.10. Safety staff

A12.4.1.3.11. Career Advisor

A12.4.1.3.12. Comptroller Squadron

A12.4.2. Group Level Photos

A12.4.2.1. The following photos will be taken of personnel within the Operations Group, Maintenance Group, Support Group and Medical Group, as applicable:

A12.4.2.1.1. Each Group Shield as a JPEG graphic on black background.

A12.4.2.1.2. Each Group Commander (Official Photo or in an office setting, not sitting behind a desk).

A12.4.2.1.3. Group photos of each squadron in the groups. (Each squadron may use a flag, banner, shield or other device to designate its identity.)

A12.5. Motivational Photos.

A12.5.1. PG1 Historical Contrast Photos.

A12.5.1.1. Historical photos may be color or black and white (B&W). Every effort will be made to capture the same image, area or unit personnel as was captured in the historical photos. Where requested historical photos do not exist or do not show sufficient contrast with new photos, substitute militarily appropriate photo sets.

A12.5.1.1.1. Historical and new photo of front gate.

A12.5.1.1.2. Historical and new photo of troops in formation.

A12.5.1.1.3. Historical and new photo of aircraft.

A12.5.1.1.4. Historical and new photo of troops.

A12.5.1.1.5. Historical and new photo of military vehicles.

A12.5.1.1.6. Historical and new photo of aircrew.

A12.5.1.1.7. Historical and new photo of support personnel.

A12.5.1.1.8. Historical and new photo of aircraft maintainers.

A12.5.2. PG2 Operations Personnel (20-30 total pictures).

A12.5.2.1. This group contains pictures of Wing and Operations Group personnel performing the wing mission. People will be the focus (foreground) of these pictures. Units are encouraged to take photos highlighting how these people accomplish the mission.

A12.5.3. PG3 Maintenance Personnel (20-30 total pictures).

A12.5.3.1. This group includes pictures of Maintenance Group personnel performing the wing mission. People should be the focus (foreground) of these pictures. Units are encouraged to take photos highlighting how these people accomplish the mission.

A12.5.4. PG4 Support Personnel (20-30 total pictures).

A12.5.4.1. This group includes pictures of Support and Medical personnel, in various jobs, performing the wing mission. People should be the focus (foreground) of the pictures. Units are encouraged to take photos highlighting how these people accomplish the mission.

A12.5.5. PG5 Wing Exercises.

A12.5.5.1. Emergency response pictures of first responders and wing personnel completing exercise and war-time tasks. Again, people must be the focus and not equipment.

A12.5.5.1.1. 7-10 photos of fire exercises, include FSTR, aircraft and other exercises.

A12.5.5.1.2. 7-10 photos of Security Forces, include FSTR and other exercises.

A12.5.5.1.3. 7-10 photos of Medical exercises, FSTR and other exercises.

A12.5.5.1.4. 7-10 photos of deployment/employment exercises.

A12.5.5.1.5. 7-10 photos of wing leadership/command and control.

A12.5.5.1.6. 7-10 photos of Specialized Teams, FSTR and other exercises.

DAWN W. WHEELER, Colonel, USAF
Inspector General